Appearances Are Deceptive With Russia and China

As January ends we want to acknowledge one final article from January 2008 Proceedings. We hope every issue this year is as well done as this months was, which exceeded the quality of almost all issues last year combined. By the way, that includes the article by Lieutenant Claude Berube, whose outstanding (members only) article we did not discuss (yet), even though his might be the best article in this months publication.

Norman Friedman uses the column regarding "World Naval Developments" (members only) to make an interesting point on the potential for a future war for resources. His conclusion points out that as the west moves to alternative fuels, we will probably be spared the need to engage in such a war, but will observe such a war between nations that will have very real needs. In making his point, these two paragraphs stuck out.

Even so, it might be interesting to examine the strategic effect of a West less dependent on oil, imported or otherwise. Imagine a future in which, although we no longer depend on Middle Eastern (and Russian) oil, the expanding Chinese and Indian economies do. Both use energy far less efficiently than we; the Chinese the least efficient of all. Much of the rising price of oil is attributed to the increasing thirst of these two economies. There is also a long-term prediction that ultimately India and China will compete for the mastery of Southeast Asia, where both have interests. Does all of this suggest that the two great Asian powers will ultimately fight in the Middle East? Neither country appears to have anything like sufficient oil reserves of its own. For example, Chinese attempts to find oil in Sinkiang were unsuccessful, and so far nothing has come of the repeated predictions that vast reserves would be found under the South China Sea.

For China, Russia represents an interesting alternative. The main Russian oil reserves are in Siberia. For some years Chinese farmers have been emigrating into largely empty areas of that territory. Chinese historians have long pointed out that much of central Siberia was once Chinese, before the tsarists seized it and ejected all the ethnic Chinese living there. Much of the rationale of communist rule over present-day China is that the party can and will restore all of the territory stolen by foreigners. Although that is usually taken to mean Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, widely-published Chinese maps of thefts include Siberia. At some point Chinese ethnics in Siberia might be inclined to raise the issue. Right now they may be happier to have escaped direct Chinese rule. However, the 20th century offered numerous examples of ardent nationalism by those separated by borders from the mother country. Why should Chinese heirs to a rich and ancient civilization be immune to nationalist impulses, particularly if they are sitting near resources of such importance to the mother country?

Every once and awhile I come across a conspiracy theory regarding the rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). I don't buy it. For as much as Putin has made it clear he doesn't like the United States, I have a hard time those same Russian leaders so easily dismiss the rise of China on their southern border. China and Russia were not friends during the cold war, there is not a historical partnership there, and the suggestion that they haven't been using each other over the last decade seems to be in defiance of the facts. In particular, I find it hard to believe Russia is comfortable with the pipeline being built to link Kazakhstan and China, or the natural gas pipeline between Turkmenistan (by transit through Uzbekistan) and China. I am not ready to buy the theory that relations between China and Russia are as good as some would try to paint it, it is counter to the personality of Putin, and Russia in general.

With that in mind, Rick tips to an interesting article in Forbes today discussing the collapse of Russian weapon exports to China. It highlights the problem the defense sector of Russia is facing, specifically that Russia isn't willing to give its best technologies to China to be built under license there, although Russia does sell those same technologies to India.

From a situation where 40 pct of Russian earnings from arms exports came from China, 'recently exports to China of our military equipment and weapons have dropped almost to zero,' the paper said.

But the main issue is indecision over which technology can safely be sold to China, as well as Beijing's desire to receive licences to do the work itself, the paper said, citing a senior officer overseeing the arms industry.

The paper said Moscow's willingness to deliver cutting-edge technology to India, another major importer of Russian weapons, had 'embittered the Chinese generals,' the paper said.

Russia has sought close military ties with China, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, while the two countries have often aligned their policies as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Even in that last paragraph, the media attempts to sell the Russian - Chinese relationship as something more than it is. Standing together against a US policy position doesn't make countries close friends. Most of the GCC nations stand with the US on Middle Eastern positions, and the US sells them plenty of defense systems, but that doesn't make the US and the GCC nations close friends. If simply having something in common made nations allies, the US and China would be major allies based on economic policies alone.

Russia has been using China as a source of income during hard economic times, but those times appear to have run their course. India doesn't require licenses to build the highest level Russian defense systems inside India, although admittedly that is the primary reason both Europeans and the US are making headway into the Indian defense sector. China wants the high tech Russian equipment, but doesn't want to buy it, they prefer the license to build their own industry.

This will be interesting to observe unfold. China was important to Russia while China was spending billions on Russian defense equipment, but without those purchases Russia may change its position, and that cold Siberian north may turn a cold shoulder to China in favor of India, where income opportunities are still available. Either way, this is just more evidence in my opinion that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is named after "Shanghai" for a reason, as it really only represents an organization designed to empower China to consolidate natural resources in Asia.