Soft Power Still a Hard Sell For the Navy

Somewhere along the way this blog went from a major opponent of the Maritime Strategy to one of only a few constant vocal defenders of it. That process was gradual, interactive, and required us to accept the new Maritime Strategy with an understanding that gradual changes will occur to force structure to meet the demands of the broader national interest, as opposed to the 1986 Maritime Strategy that was specific in its outline and direction by articulating means to ends of a national policy to confront the ideological expansion of communism. A strategy today can no longer afford to be as simplistic to articulate as it was in 1986, our nation’s primary economic partners are in fact communists, and globalization requires multiple approaches tailored to regional requirements. The complexity is in fact one major reason why the new Maritime Strategy has not been popularly accepted since its release in October.

The Christian Science Monitor has an article up on the Navy's new Maritime Strategy. The article, titled U.S. Navy aims to flex 'soft power', is yet another example of the difficult road ahead for the Navy as it attempts to sell its new strategy. This piece is about as good as the Navy will ever be able to expect from regular media channels, and that is unfortunate.

The Navy's new maritime strategy, unveiled this fall and shared by the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, is a shift in tone that reflects a broader change in the Pentagon's approach as it organizes itself for what many military officials refer to as a "generational conflict" against extremism. It's a move away from the go-it-alone stance of the Bush White House and toward a new emphasis on building partnerships abroad and finding common interests.

Critics say that while the Navy's new approach is noble, the sea service should stick to meeting more conventional threats to US security from countries like China and build more ships that can be used to flex America's naval muscle.

My guess is these critics would be the same people telling us we are living in a post 9/11 world. My observations of a post 9/11 world are that the world is no longer easily summarized by zero sum approaches. It isn't one or the other; our leaders have often required a Navy to meet both challenges for our national interests, not one or the other.

It also doesn't make sense that someone familiar with China would advocate for only a conventional military approach to China. A conventional naval capability is critical, but doesn't require all the resources, there is room in expenditures for irregular warfare capabilities. When you observe China closely, as we do, the first thing you realize is China has a three tier strategy that must be countered: Space Power, Naval Power, and Soft Power. We do not think it is an accident the Navy assumes ownership of these critical roles to some degree within its Maritime Strategy. China is making moves with soft power, it is only responsible that the Navy, who has global reach, accepts the challenge and carries the soft power burden for the United States to counter those challenges.

Secretary Winter gives us a quote as he attempts to sell the Navy's soft power role in the article.

It really does get to the idea of being able to use the broad spectrum of capabilities that the fleet provides," he says in a recent interview. "The fleet is more than just combat capability. The fleet has really always had an almost diplomatic capability."

When the United States wants to put a couple hundred Americans in Peru to wave the flag, do some community service, spend some money, and interact with the citizens in Peru what options does the United States government have? In reality, there is only one option: The US Navy. The Navy doesn't articulate this point very well to average Joe and Jane American, mostly because the print media and television media are not very good mediums for getting the message out.

The article goes on to discuss the Flashy Toys vs Flashy Ideas debate we observed earlier this month on Capital Hill. It also notes the speech made by SECDEF Gates at Kansas State, a speech which I thought was brilliant. The article also ends with some commentary on what we would agree is where the attention is focused going into 2008 on the Maritime Strategy issue.

"There are a lot of Americans who are inside the US government who have the knowledge and have a pretty good and clear sense of what needs to happen," says Rick Barton, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington.

But Mr. Barton, who had not been briefed on the Navy's new strategy, says such approaches are mere "tokenism" if they aren't backed up with the resources they need to be effective.

"Until you see the incentives, careers, and capital expenditures lining up, all you have is more rhetoric than fact," Barton says.

Mr. Barton is right, but we don't even see the rhetoric getting much play. For example, when you look back at all the attention given early for the Global Fleet Stations pilot mission, why wasn't their a follow up series of discussions regarding lessons learned, value, problems, solutions, and examples of success or failure. It is hard to work up incentive for NGOs to work with Global Fleet Stations if there are no highlights of the advantages the mission profile offers.

That is just one example, the Comfort mission is another. There are plenty more... With the lack of attention to naval approaches to executing the new Maritime Strategy soft power approaches, one could conclude the Navy needs to deal with its own shortcomings in getting the word out regarding its strategy. Partnership isn't sexy, so it's no wonder the concepts backed by capital expenditures are the only ones getting attention in Washington. This article is about the best the Navy can hope for through traditional media channels on the new Maritime Strategy, maybe it is about time they look for a new mediums to get the word out.