Sustaining the US Submarine Industry

In another of those excellent articles in the November issue of National Defense Magazine, Grace Jean gives us one of the most comprehensive updates you can find on the state and sustainment of the US domestic submarine industry. Titled Shipbuilders Forecast Exodus of Submarine Designers, the article highlights both the recent successes and future challenges of the industry to sustain itself. The submarine industry has been warning for years that trouble lies ahead, and that the Navy need to increase submarine production and begin to design the next generation boats soon, or the shipyards will lose irreplaceable skilled workers.

The problem comes down to simple economics. As submarines have become more expensive and time consuming to build, the Navy has been able to afford fewer of them. The upshot has been growing costs for the shipyards, mostly attributed to having to keep a skilled workforce in place even in the absence of contracts, industry experts say.

The debate has now resurfaced in the context of the Virginia-class fast attack submarine. As the design work winds down and the boats continue in production, shipbuilders are warning the Navy that without a new submarine on the drawing board within the next several years, experienced scientists and designers will retire or leave the industry.

The result would be higher costs and delays in production once a new program is launched, shipbuilders caution.

Though the next submarine program is not slated to start until 2019, design efforts typically commence several years in advance because the entire process often takes 15 to 17 years.

Historically, as one submarine class is completed and put into the water, designers and engineers on the program will roll right into the design process for its successor. But there is no new design underway for the first time since the Nautilus, the Navy’s first nuclear submarine, was commissioned in 1954.

The article is long and detailed, and an excellent read. It highlights the value of the submarine design skills the industry is advocating for in pointing out the recent successes I discussed the other day with the Virginia class submarine, but also points out that General Dynamics Electric Boat dispatched Engineering teams to help bail the British out on their Astute program when the British lost critical design and industrial skill between that program and the Vanguard program.

To prevent that from happening, the next design should be launched as soon as possible, he said. “There’s very little liability in starting a design early and getting it done.”

The Rand study found that starting the design early in 2009 would lead to savings over time.

“One of the advantages of starting early is that it allows you to approach it in a more controlled manner,” said Butler. “It allows you to perhaps develop your prototypes so that they’ll be a little more mature, so you enter an acquisition program with a little less risk. And this seems to be in line with the current thinking of the Navy, to control cost overruns on future programs.”

Electric Boat officials advocated the design start in 2009 to take advantage of the learning that engineers acquired during the Virginia redesign program. The company believes that the best way to design a ship is by pairing a new engineer with an experienced one. A later start date means there may be fewer experienced designers on the team available to mentor younger workers.

When you consider where the situation of the submarine force 10 years ago, and follow the roller-coaster to this point today, it really is an interesting study with many current lessons of value. For example, the USS Seawolf (SSN 21) was commissioned in 1997, and at the time it was already known there was no way the Navy was going to build more than 3 of them. The USS Virginia (SSN 774) was awarded in 1998 under a dark cloud that questioned the seriousness of the sub service regarding cost controls.

Since then the Navy has redesigned the first 4 SSBNs into SSGNs, already returning 3 to sea with the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) already on its first deployment. That program is widely touted as the most innovative and perhaps one of the most important "transformations" in the entire DoD. The design of the Virginia has been in flux, with 2 designs already being fielded, and a third set to begin in 2012 which is now being highlighted as yet another example of innovation. Submarines have somehow achieved in design exactly what the surface fleet has tried to do, modularity, and by leveraging interchangeable Multiple All-Up-Round Canisters (MAC) and support for off board systems, it is the undersea branch leading the way as the surface fleet struggles in costs and designs.

All of these advancements are taking place with no one is really discussing the MIW advancements of the underwater service (the SSGN is now assumed the most capable MIW platform in the Navy should it ever be assigned that role), or the already funded R&D for anti-aircraft missiles capable of being deployed in MACs to take on enemy aircraft and helicopters supporting ASW missions against US submarines.

Not sure why..., DID covers the contracts, the larger budgetary and strategic research documents discuss these topics, but these topics are next to impossible to find any dedicated media articles covering the topics.

In 1997 many in the Navy, not to mention outside observers, saw the cost problems of submarines and overruns of the Seawolf class (followed by similar cost problems with the Virginia class) as a valid reason to stick the sub service in the back of the pack. Noteworthy as the entire force transitions to UUVs, modularity concepts, and cost cutting measures the sub service has somehow found themselves worthy of being front of the line by embracing all three concepts and integrating them into business. The designers, the industry, and the Admirals that have accepted every challenge and helped turn them into results deserve a lot of credit.

Hopefully there will be reward for the efforts, and Congress will find a way to sustain the irreplaceable skilled workers facing an uncertain future. IMO it isn't just wise from a strategic perspective, or smart from a political perspective, but Congress can finally put some leverage into the rest of the maritime industry by rewarding success for a change, instead of accepting failure without recourse.

One final thought. Molten Eagle is ready to take on more of the dirty work for the DoD in the form of the MOP, and the more I think about it, I see no reason why not. More on the MOP here.