The 313-Ship Plan: Iceberg Ahead!

Back in 2003, Congress became frustrated as the Navy constantly changed the rational behind the Navy's fleet operational requirements. At the time, inflation in shipbuilding was becoming a noticeable problem to Congress, so they instructed the Secretary of Defense to submit two "Naval Fleet Platform Architectural Studies" by January 2005.

The Law directed that one of the studies be conducted by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT), Office of the Secretary Of Defense (OSD), and the other by an independent Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), which was conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA).

At the time, Robert (Bob) Work of the independent Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies (CSBA) also conducted his own study. The CNA study has never been released publicly (that I know of), but the OFT report and CSBA report are available online. In April, Ronald O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Office released a final summery that compares all 3 reports.

Personally, I find both the OFT report and the CSBA reports a good read, well worth the time for those looking to understand 'some' of the alternatives to the current USN 313-Ship plan. I will warn traditionalists though, the OFT report is an exercise in theory based on some of the Cebrowski models of the late 90s.

With these reports in hand, and the Defense Science Board's recent report on Sea Basing, Congress should have been ready to take on the Navy when the 313-ship plan was produced. The Bush Administration had spent 5 years producing a shipbuilding plan that indicated what ships would be built the following year, only to change the plan again the next year. FY07 was supposed to be the first year this pattern didn't happen, until Congress decided this year to cancel the 2 FY07 LCS ships and fold that money into the first 3 LCS for cost reasons. That makes the upcoming FY08 budget the first year this may happen, but again because of LCS costs, that may not happen. This volatility in shipbuilding is compounding the inflation problems, and that lack of consistent planning and proper budgeting ships from the Navy leaves many with no confidence for the future for good reason.

The Congressional Budget Office (report), as well as other independent researchers like Eric J Labs, have drawn several conclusions from the 313-ship fleet. Bottom line, itis not affordable.

Graph by Bob Work in his Congressional Testimony says it all.

Assuming no inflation:

The Navy expects Sea Basing to cost $14.5 Billion for a single MPF(F) squadron. The Navy expects the LCS to cost around $18 Billion for 54 LCS and 108 modules. The costs of both have already risen considerably. The Navy expects the DD(X) to cost $20 billion for 7 ships. That is $52.5 billion.

The CBO estimates for all 3 programs are considerably higher, and if you add up their estimates the number is closer to $70 billion. The cancellation of LCS-3 in the first full fiscal year of the 313-Ship plan is an early sign of big problems ahead. While we can't call it the 312-Ship plan until after the FY08 defense budget is finalized, hopefully Congress is paying attention.

We'll see, rumors of more submarines and a 10th LPD means Democrats may be doing their own thing with the Navy, but it is still too early to tell. With Democrats and defense issues, the reason they have earned their reputation for being weak is because on National Security issues, they are too obviously trying to please their base for political points as opposed to publicly addressing a national security issue with wisdom. That type of governance doesn't inspire professionals.

iceberg, dead ahead.