2nd Fleet Focus: Venezuela's Growing Navy

The US 2nd Fleet's Area of Responsibility is steadily becoming a focus of US policy. The two areas getting attention include the western coastof Africa, specifically the Gulf of Guinea, but also the Caribbean region with the problematic Hugo Chavez. A January 22nd, 2007 CRS report on "Latin America: Terrorism Issues" summed up the concern for the new Congress regarding Venezuela:

According to the State Department’s April 2006 terrorism report, Venezuela has virtually ceased its cooperation in the global war on terror, tolerated terrorist in its territory, and sought close relations with Cuba and Iran, both state sponsors of terrorism. As noted above, Colombian terrorist groups use Venezuela territory for safehaven, although it is unclear whether and to what extent the government of President Hugo Chávez provides material support to these terrorist groups and at what level. According to the State Department report, Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents are easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists. In mid-May 2006, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, prohibited the sale or license of defense article and services to Venezuela because of its lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts. Other countries on the Section 40A list include Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979. (For further information, see CRS Report RL32488, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.)

In late May, Chavez declared war on the media within Venezuela. As a follow up, Venezuela is making headlines this week with reports out of Russia that President Hugo Chavez is looking to buy submarines from Russia. This isn't actually new news, it is just details of old news, this time in English. Back in January Mer et Marine ran a story that a Venezuelan admiral was looking to buy 9 SSKs. As the story went, they originally approached DCN regarding the Scorpene, but France wasn't interested. Venezuela then went looking for other options, including the Russian Amur and German U212, but also found Mer et Marine was interested and would sell Venezuela the S-80. Since the S-80 has US equipment in it, the Scorpene is a more likely sell (they are co-owner of the Scorpene project with DCN).

The story faded and there wasn't much news about Venezuelan submarines until now. There are some details that Mer et Marine released back in January regarding the Venezuela purchase, among them 50 days autonomy and an AIP requirement. From the details released in the Russian media, it would appear the Russians would sell Venezuela 5 Kilo class and 4 Amus class. It will be interesting to see what happens, not only to see if the Germans get involved in the competition (unlikely) but if Venezuela actually follows through.

Submarines isn't the only naval equipment Venezuela is buying though, they are in the market for small boats too.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez authorized the Navy Commander Vice-admiral Benigno Remigio Calvo to enter into a USD 261 million "trade agreement" with Spanish firm Rodman Polyships for joint construction of 66 boats and purchase of construction material for other 40 units to be manufactured in Venezuela.

It would appear Iranian Maritime Strategy has made its way to Venezuela. The story of the buy from Rodman Polyships SAU isn't specific regarding the type or weapons, however Rodman offers types in sizes from 10m to 44m with speeds from 30 to 50 knots.

Whenever any country puts 9 new SSKs in your backyard, the 2nd Fleet should be concerned. A 2007 Comparative Atlas of Defense and Security in Latin America, prepared by the Network of Security and Defense of Latin America (Resdal), sums up the growing Venezuala military.

The Venezuelan Armed Force comprises 92,350 officers, excluding the National Guard -which is described in the study as an "administrative police corps"- and the complementary "bodies" such as the Military Reserve and the
Territorial Guard.

Including the four branches of the Armed Force (Army, Aviation, Navy and National Guard) the number raises to 129,150 people. Almost half of them (49 percent) are in the Army (63,350 officers); 28.5 percent in the National Guard (36,800 people); 13.6 percent in the Navy (17,500 officers) and 8.9 percent in the Aviation (11,500 people), said Rocío San Miguel, one of the Venezuelan representatives to the network founded in 2001.

The "National Guard" and "Administrative Police Corps" are not what the names imply. These are political military organizations, not law enforcement, that are more akin to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard than the Alabama National Guard. Last December the Federation of American Scientists blog weighed in on the concern of an arms build up in South America, and the problems with Venezuela's current policy. The money quote:

While Chavez’s colorful insults steal the headlines, the issue of greatest importance—the influx of thousands of rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition into a region rife with black market arms trafficking—has received scant meaningful attention.

What does the arms buildup mean? A Second Falklands? Probably not, but a review of ASW capabilities in the Caribbean followed by a number of high profile exercises wouldn't be a bad response.

(Bottom Picture Caption) An army sniper takes part in a military exercise in La Guaira, about 30 km (20 miles) outside Caracas June 6, 2006. The exercise for unconventional warfare and resistance is meant to repel a foreign invasion and defend Venezuela's territory and sovereignty, officials said. (VENEZUELA) 06 Jun 2024 REUTERS/Jorge Silva