Myanmar and Kokang conflict spilling over to China

In this past month, Myanmar air force has apparently waded into Chinese territory 3 times as part of its ongoing struggles with Kokang rebels. In the most recent time, bombs were dropped which killed 5 Chinese citizens. Due to the fact that the vast majorities of Kokang population are ethnically Han Chinese and use RMB as their currency, there is understandably a lot of sympathy in China toward the plight of Kokang. Many people have compared this to Russia and Crimea and others wonder if China should do more in this conflict.

As usual, China keeps to its official stance of not interfering with another country’s internal affairs while building up air defense capabilities in the border area. China painstakingly makes it clear that it’s not supporting Kokang rebels causes, because it has relatively good relationship with Myanmar and does a lot of business in the country. In the future, it is also possible that China would want to set up base in Myanmar to access Indian Ocean. So it should be quite understandable that PLA does not devote much resource in this area. There is 2 regiments stationed in the area, but they are quite a distance away from where the bombings took place. A lot of people were wondering about the readiness of PLAAF to respond to intrusions, but it seems like they really didn’t have that much time based on where the intrusions happened.

The interesting part is that Myanmar first reacted to these bombings by putting the blames on the rebels and absolving itself of all responsibility. They have since toned down their accusations and may have even offered compensations to the victim’s families, but I think they really looked quite foolish in the process. A swift apology and some kind of pledge to investigate the matters would have done a lot to pacify the anger in China right now. As it is, the Chineses gov’t is under pressure to do something.

So far, it looks like they have told Myanmar that this kind of action is not acceptable and will not be tolerated. And I think that if China wants to be the leader in this region, it certainly cannot allow repeated incursion of its airspace and bombing of its citizens. The way to do that is by building up more air defense weapon systems and installing more early warning radar in the range. If China’s radar cannot reliable track Myanmar’s Mig-29s, then they need to improve those radar systems. And if another deadly bombing does occur, then they probably need to launch strikes against certain Myanmar military targets. Other than that, it is in China's interest to keep this as low-key as possible.

The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Glass Half Empty?

The new, 2015 U.S. Naval Maritime Strategy has been generally praised by most commentators as the appropriate next step from the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.  That previous effort was well designed and crafted for its time and attendant international environment. The present document, however, has not moved far enough forward from the now receding post-Cold War Era (1991-2009). It remains largely a capabilities rather than a threat-based document in an era of new, and increasing threats. It is not supported by a well-defined force structure requirement as were past successful strategies in similar threat-based conditions. Finally, while the new strategy makes a great effort to describe global partnerships, it leaves out the Navy’s greatest partner; the United States Congress. Instead, the strategy uses the Navy as a tool to criticize the Congress for the effects of sequestration, a condition for which both the executive and legislative branches of government bear responsibility. This author would predict that unlike the 2007 document, this strategy will at best be an interim or bridging effort toward what the next Presidential administration intends in regard to national security and associated service strategies.

Despite identifying significant new threats not seen in its predecessor, the new naval strategy remains largely a capabilities-based document based on what the U.S. will field, but only vague about what threats they mitigate. Although first implemented as official doctrine by then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2001, capabilities-based planning had been development since the mid 1990’s as a replacement for traditional threat-based military assessment. In a January 2002 speech to the National Defense University (NDU) faculty and students, Rumsfeld described capabilities-based assessment as different in that, “Instead of building our armed forces around plans to fight this or that country, we need to examine our vulnerabilities, asking ourselves, as Frederick the Great did in his great General Principles of War, what design would I be forming if I were the enemy, and then fashioning our forces as necessary to deter and defeat those threats.” This imaginative planning method worked well in the environment of the 2000’s that was devoid of defined conventional threats and populated principally by non-state actors. The emerging threats identified in the new maritime strategy, however, are a combination of continuing non-state actor activity, but also greater hostility from traditional states such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as the “challenge” of China. In this period of hybrid threat it is necessary to determine in more detail what force structure is required to meet a single, or combination of challenges. 

The British maintained a similar philosophy in the late 1920's and early 1930's when planning for future conflicts. The Royal Navy was deemed superior to the most probable threat from the Japanese Empire. The British assumed that the Royal Navy (RN) would be capable enough in its reduced, post 1919-size to undertake an expeditionary campaign against Japan alone if required. This assessment, however, proved impractical when the British had to employ the bulk of the RN to fight even the modest German Kriegsmarine and the Italian Navy in 1939. When the Japanese joined the war in 1941, Britain's failure to base it fleet on the possibility of war with all three Axis nations cost them many of the Pacific possessions, including Singapore, the Malaysian peninsula, and Hong Kong. Like the British Empire of the past, the U.S. has global responsibilities, and while agreements with friends and allies to assume parts can reduce U.S. commitments and risks, they are historically not always guaranteed to assure success. The British depended on the French to largely manage the Mediterranean Sea against the Italian Navy when war broke out in 1939. France's collapse in 1940, however, demanded a much greater commitment in the Med by the RN, and thus deprived it of the forces needed to secure the Pacific against Japanese aggression. The U.S. has also seen its plans disrupted by allies, as in the case of the 1986 Dorado Canyon air strikes against Libya, when a number of NATO allies refused the US access to their bases or airspace, and in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when a number of allies refused to join the coalition campaign against Saddam Hussein, or refused to allow the U.S. access to their nation in order to conduct the campaign.

The biggest problem with capabilities-based planning is that it is open to interpretation as to what defines an adequate “capability”. The history of the numerical decline of the U.S. fleet from 1993 to the present is one of different opinions on what it takes to provide for a specific capability. A threat-based assessment, on the other hand, usually results in an analysis that states specific numbers of platforms and payloads required to overcome a specific threat. The return of nation state threats to the strategic equation likewise requires the return of threat analysis to the business of strategy creation. The U.S. is no longer just creatively estimating what hypothetical opponents might do; their are potential, known opponent force structures with which to contend. While some capabilities-based assessment should continue, it should be accompanied by an effective threat-based component for the nations labeled as potential troublemakers in the 2015 strategy.

The new maritime strategy does emphasize some numbers in its calculus. It lists specific new deployments that have been accomplished or well planned including those of four destroyers to the Mediterranean for ballistic missile defense, four nuclear fast attack submarines to Guam, and the proposed basing of four littoral combat ships (LCS) to Singapore. The strategy also states that the U.S. must maintain a fleet of 300 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers, 14, and later 12 ballistic missile submarines, and 33 amphibious ships, as well as a Coast Guard of 91 high, medium, and low endurance cutters. These numbers are given in an almost defensive context rather than in a bold statement of purpose. One might imagine the Roman Emperor Hadrian making similar statements about the various walls, including the famous one in Britain that bears his name, as the best means of imperial defense rather than the active legions of men that sustained them. Hadrian’s Wall ultimately only delayed the barbarian’s advance. These ship numbers too may only delay the inevitable cuts in force structure that often occur in the absence of a defined fleet tailored to specific foes.

These numbers are further unaccompanied by any specific analysis or indication of how many ships the deployed regional commanders may actually require. This lack of specific, secure linkage to analysis or demand signal makes these numbers open to question, and eventual reduction. The best naval strategies from the British Royal Navy’s “Two Power Standard” of 1889 to the U.S. 1980’s Maritime Strategy harnessed a specific number of ships as defined by threat analysis to advance and maintain the fleet strength necessary to fulfill their requirements. The British based their fleet strength of the combined naval forces of their imperial rivals France and Russia. The vaunted 15 carrier fleet on the 1980’s was well supported by a number of carrier requirement studies done in the late 1970’s and identified by future Navy Secretary John Lehman in his book Aircraft Carriers, The Real Choices. Unlike these past successful efforts, the 2015 Maritime strategy does not reference any specific analysis in support of these numbers. While the present budget environment may be dismal, and preservation of current forces rather than advances in fleet strength the goal, the new strategy should have taken a more aggressive approach in articulating the fleet's numerical needs.

Finally, while the Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and the fleets of friends and allies get substantial reference in the new strategy, the U.S. Navy’s most important partner receives little attention. The U.S. Congress receives no mention other than on the first page with a note that Congress is compelled by the Constitution to maintain a Navy. Congressional support is vital to the achievement of any military strategic planning. While the new strategy does not call for a building program and associated additional expenditures as did the 1980’s Maritime Strategy, the Navy will require Congressional support to prevent the fleet from further shrinkage. Instead, the Navy and other service chiefs regularly parade in front of House and Senate Armed Services Committees to decry the effects of sequestration on their respective orders of battle. This is somewhat unfair, as sequestration is a problem created by disagreement between the legislative and executive branches of government on overall public spending. It is further exasperated by political disagreement due to the difference in political party control of these organs of constitutional government.

This situation is made worse, however, due to the fact that Congress in effect “voted itself off the island” of national security influence when it approved the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. Congress believed the legislation would result in less parochial, better organized armed forces that spent the taxpayers money in more efficient ways through greater control by the Department of Defense. The actual effect, however, was to further place the military under the control of the political party in control of the presidency. The positioning of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the President’s principal military advisor had the effect of making this officer a de facto member of the administration, rather than the first among a group of five equal senior officers in the JCS. Goldwater Nichols fulfilled a prerequisite of former CJCS and military reform supporter General Maxwell Taylor, who said, “the chairman should not only support the president's decisions but also be a true believer in them.” Congressional influence in such an environment is reduced. The services however need Congressional support to sustain the strategies they propose in limited budget environments. Parading the Constitutionally- unbiased service chiefs in front of Congress to berate the legislative branch alone for sequestration is disingenuous at best.

Not all elements of the new Maritime strategy are bad. It recognizes the limits of geography on naval strategy. It specifies a greater role for cyber warfare and it includes some specific joint and international partnerships essential to the achievement of U.S. goals. The strategy remains, however, deficient in three specific categories. If the widely distributed threat from Russia, Iran, North Korea, and possibly China is significant enough to mention in print, it must be addressed by a specific force structure derived from a threat-based analysis. That force structure, like the 600 Ship Navy that supported the 1980’s Maritime strategy, should be independent of what the budget may or may not support. As independent professionals, senior uniformed officers must speak truth to power and identify the resources required to ensure the nation’s maritime security. It is then the decision of elected leaders as to how much risk they choose to assume if the disregard professional military advice. Finally, the new Maritime strategy ought to more actively encourage Congressional support and interaction. In its present format, Congress is a mere footnote.

This strategy is likely a bridging document to the next Presidential administration and Congress who will put their own different stamp on the nation’s national security and attendant service strategies. The document could also change if China continues to present more challenges to the present maritime world order rather than seek cooperative actions within its boundaries. The 2015 Maritime Strategy, unlike its 2007, or even 1980’s predecessors, is unlikely to have a long service life, so maritime security planners should perhaps busy themselves with the next volume. Hopefully that document will fill the strategic glass above the midway point.

Conventional Deterrence Developments in the Baltics

In mid-February, it was reported that the 1^st Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT) from the 3rd Infantry Division was deploying ‘to Europe’ for three months. It was implied that the BCT would disaggregate to conduct training events with host nation forces in the Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania, Germany, and Poland.

It now seems that the BCT deployment will be concentrated in the Baltics. The Army is also stating that the BCT’s tanks and armored personnel carriers will remain prepositioned in the region.

I’m not certain, but the amount of armor to remain prepositioned appears to be an increase from what was being described back in December.

Unlike a parade of a handful of armored vehicles through the streets of Narva, the deployment of a BCT is a very serious move. I’ll leave detailed comparisons between this BCT and the Russian order of battle adjacent to the Baltics to experts on ground warfare, which I most assuredly am not. All the same, my gut instinct is that the deployment of a heavy BCT falls somewhere between delay/disruption and tripwire on Robert Rubel’s spectrum of forward presence. In the absence of evident tactical air support as well as air and missile defense support, I would think the needle still points towards tripwire, but the level of commitment that this deployment appears designed to signal is significant.

The obvious follow-on question is whether this BCT will turn over its armor directly to a relieving unit that will take over this presence mission, and if not, what the concept of operations would be to transport personnel forward to marry up with this equipment in a crisis.

Very interesting.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Some Additional Thoughts on the New Maritime Strategy

Bryan Clark of CSBA and I have a piece up at War on the Rocks analyzing the new Maritime Strategy, a document we both like but which we felt could have been stronger in a few areas. I'm proud of the thinking in our piece, but in the interests of space and readability, there were a few things I left out that I'll share with readers here at ID.  Here is a link to the new strategy.

First, reviewing a document which has as a consequence of its issuance, the impact of relegating the Maritime Strategy of 2007 to the dustbin of history, is a dicey proposition given my connection with the previous document. The very existence of the new work means that "my baby was ugly", and no one likes that.  Well, almost no one, given the fact that I have been publicly calling for the 2007 document to be replaced since 2009.  That said, my offering criticism on the new strategy offers those unfamiliar with my position on the previous one a fine opportunity to take the low road.

Next, while to the general public, the release of the new strategy is timed perfectly, having had no expectation of its release, for the rest of us, it has taken an awful long time to come out.  CNO Greenert came into office in the Fall of 2011 and made revising (or refreshing, as I think the term of art then was) the 2007 Strategy a priority. I honestly don't know why it took as long as it did for the release of the new strategy, but having worked closely with the office of the CNO before (not this one), if the CNO had wanted it out earlier, it would have come out earlier.  My uninformed guess is that with all of the tumult of his term, he had bigger fish to fry, and this project simply didn't capture his attention in the midst of everything else he was dealing with.  Now--in the finishing holes of the back nine of his term, CNO really had to put more of an emphasis on getting it out.

Now lets talk about the "ends, ways, means" thing.  Anyone familiar with my writing on strategy knows that I bristle at this construct as incredibly limiting.  When Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work was a lowly think tank vice president and I was a lowly strategy writer on the OPNAV Staff, he and I were having lunch when he brought up the lack of such a linkage in the document that I had just been a part of producing.  My answer to him there was "Beat Germany First".  I offered that this was the strategy that won WWII, and while academic strategists can focus on angels on pin heads, good strategy sometimes takes forms other than the classic ends, ways, means approach.  I have written elsewhere that where grand strategy is concerned, ends-ways-means is inappropriate, as a true grand strategy has the benefit of being able to define its own means.  That I would collaborate on a piece that seizes on the ends-ways-means debate is hypocritical, and I completely own up to that.  My defense is this: one of the virtues of this strategy is its less "grand" approach.  It is harder edged and more of a focused military strategy.  The more focused and narrow a strategy, the more the ends-ways-means construct applies.  Additionally, given the degree to which the previous document was criticized for the lack of such a linkage, I would have thought there would be a stronger link here.

Throughout the elongated process of putting this new document together, I was asked by the various and changing personalities associated with it to come to the Pentagon and talk with them, or read what they had so far.  I gave them honest and tough feedback, as I remembered how important that was from others during the time I was writing strategy.  I made a number of suggestions along the way, but I made three consistently, none of which were incorporated into the final draft, which proves the value of my input.  The first was that the new strategy did not adequately address the role of American Seapower in what clearly (to me) appears to be the re-emergence of great power dynamics.  China and Russia are treated in it, but as regional threats rather than as systemic threats.  Next, at every opportunity, I advocated for a strong argument for maintaining a robust naval industrial base, to ensure excess capacity would be available for wartime.  This is exactly the kind of thing that should go in a document of strategy, and it is one of the great regrets that I have about the 2007 version that we did not address it.

My third consistently stated objection was the inclusion of "All Domain Access" as one of the "five essential functions of seapower", along with deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.  I think this one had to be a CNO red line, as all through the process of putting this document together, there were a chorus of reviewers who said essentially the same thing, that All Domain Access was a condition, or a quality, or the result--of essential functions, rather than a function unto itself.  Don't get me wrong--I think all domain access is an important enabler of operations, I simply didn't agree with its inclusion in with the other "functions".  My suspicion is that the CNO really wanted to hammer this one hard, and that the elevation of the provision and sustenance of "access" was one of the foot stompers he wanted readers to take from this.

One final thought, and this one comes a bit from the "my baby is ugly" department.  The 2007 Strategy had a lot of warts and was subject to a lot of justified criticism.  But it had a central idea animating it, and it was a powerful one--what Barney Rubel from the Naval War College like to refer to as the "defense of the global system" argument.  I don't see such a central argument in the new version, and worse, it sorta walks away from the entire defense of the global system meme altogether.  The chance was here to stake one (I would have recommended "the role of Seapower in emerging great power competition), but it wasn't taken.

All of these words should not take away from the fact that I think the new strategy is a great piece of work that very thoughtfully updates the sea services' thinking in a new strategic era.  Congratulations are in order to everyone associated with it; I know how good it feels to finally be done with it.

Some Thoughts on Conventional Deterrence by Punishment

Widely accepted conventional deterrence theory holds that an opponent is more likely to forego conventional aggression if he perceives that he likely will not be able to achieve his political objectives quickly, cheaply, with a tolerable degree of risk, and with an acceptable degree of uncertainty. As I’ve previously noted

…conventional deterrence does not necessarily require convincing a potential adversary that any military aggression it might embark upon would be handily repulsed. Though such defensive capacity represents an ideal, defenders can obtain conventional deterrence by denial if an opportunistic antagonist is convinced that the defender possesses conventional forces of sufficient capability, quantity, readiness, and proximity to the contested area to ensure any conceivable conventional offensive by the antagonist stands an unacceptable chance of degenerating into a costly, risky, protracted, and indecisive conflict. (Pg 118)

The other primary form of deterrence is that achieved through the latent threat of punishment. This entails

…the use of one or more forms of national power to inflict damage upon a transgressor who violates the defender’s deterrence threshold. This damage can be against fielded military forces and their infrastructure, industrial infrastructure supporting military production, civil and economic infrastructure, governmental institutions and authorities (potentially including leaders themselves), and/or civil populations. The duration can range from a one-time blow to a series of blows or pressure over a protracted period. Deterrence by punishment therefore is geared around the latent threat of inflicting a degree of damage that a potential adversary deems unacceptable, which in turn restrains that potential adversary from taking the proscribed action. (Pg. 149)

Nuclear deterrence represents this approach in its ultimate form. At the conventional level, though, the latent threat of inflicting punishments against non-military ‘countervalue’ targets generally lacks the efficacy of ‘counterforce’ deterrence by denial. This is especially the case against risk-tolerant opponents:

Such opponents can reasonably conclude any retaliatory conventional punishment will be neither logistically nor politically sustainable over long time frames, might present greater strategic risks for the punisher than for the transgressor, and may not even impose enough pain on the right pressure points to counterbalance their desired political objectives. If the opponent is driven to act against the status quo by desperation or fear, a latent threat of conventional punishment will provide no more of a barrier than a latent threat of denial. It follows that these considerations also apply to latent threats of economic and diplomatic punishments, and deterrence policies centered on these kinds of punishments will likely only prove viable when an opponent assigns a particular political objective a relatively low value, or its popular passions are not heavily engaged.[1] (Pg. 120)

Most of the conceptual conventional deterrence by punishment policies I’ve seen publicly discussed in the security studies community are countervalue-oriented. It is difficult to see much wisdom in them given the preceding logic. Such policies’ deterrence credibility would almost certainly be low.

But what of ‘counterforce’ conventional deterrence by punishment? I must admit I didn’t fully explore that angle when I wrote my SSQ article two years ago. Unlike striking 'regime targets' or economic infrastructure, punitive attacks against military targets could double as or otherwise support the defender’s direct defense efforts. They arguably also would be more likely to injure the opponent's domestic and international prestige, physically harm a central pillar of the opponent's leaders' political power, and immediately compound the risks and uncertainties facing the opponent’s offensive operations. In this sense, the bludgeoning of an opponent’s forces can sometimes serve countervalue ends. Confining the fight to the military domain would additionally allow the defender to avoid setting the precedent of striking non-military targets first (unless this was a non-issue because the opponent had already set that precedent), as well as offer the defender more flexibility in tailoring his retaliation to mitigate the risks of inadvertent or accidental escalation.

Consequently, there is logic in creating a strong latent threat of inflicting unacceptable ‘pain’ upon an opponent’s forces should some defined transgression occur. Alternatively, if the opponent does engage in aggression, the active application of this ‘pain’ might deter him from escalating further (or trying anything similar via a future offensive) if he can be convinced that he’d just be shoveling more of his military power onto a funeral pyre. Both approaches could be particularly useful if the defender possesses little to no practical (or perceived) capacity for conventional deterrence by denial against the opponent.

What might relevant targets be? First and foremost would be the opponent’s fielded forces committing the proscribed aggression. By virtue of invading, flying over or near, or operating at sea near a defended territory, many of the opponent’s forces would inherently be exposing themselves to the defender’s attacks. Expeditionary lodgments in remote, isolated territories such as minor islands would arguably be the most exposed in this sense. In fact, it would be perfectly rational for a defender to focus his military efforts not on preventing the opponent from seizing some such territory, but rather on making every moment the opponent remained in that territory extraordinarily costly to him in blood, treasure, and prestige.

Another form of punishment might be persistent and protracted squeezing of the opponent’s flow of logistical support to his forward forces—especially to those blockading or occupying the defender’s territory. Logistics transport platforms are often ‘soft’ targets, and as the amount of shipments lost increases there is often a disproportionate impact on the security, endurance, and comfort of the opponent’s forward forces.

Not all of the opponent’s forces would necessarily be actively engaged against the defender, however. Some of his forces might be more useful for projecting power against other countries in the region or beyond. Other forces might be more useful for asserting control or denial over ‘global commons’ areas within the opponent’s reach. Still others might figure prominently in supporting the opponent regime’s domestic political control. All these forces could be valuable targets for attrition via punitive strikes as determined by how the defender’s leaders value their political objectives and assess the associated escalation risks.

‘Military infrastructure’ would be an additional type of punitive target. These might be military bases and logistical support facilities, or perhaps civilian-sector infrastructure like shipyards or transportation systems that directly support the opponent’s offensive operations. Other important targets would be the 'systems of systems' that provide communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the opponent’s conventional forces. Lastly, facilities that conduct or support military-technological research, development, and production could be targets carrying longer-term value. The common denominator in this ‘infrastructural’ class of military targets is that they would either be critical to the conduct of the opponent’s military operations, or would directly affect his military power in the future. Many of these targets would have the added benefit of being very difficult, resource-intensive, and time-consuming to repair or replace. Again, the defender’s leaders’ valuation of their political objectives and assessments of escalation risks would be key in determining whether and how ‘military infrastructural’ targets would be struck.

There are a few caveats, of course. As a colleague pointed out to me, one cannot threaten relatively light conventional counterforce punishment that would not appreciably alter the theater ‘correlation of forces’ for a strategically significant amount of time and still expect to obtain deterrence. The degree—and duration—of threatened damage against the opponent’s forces should be commensurate with the nature of the transgression. In an extended deterrence case, the last thing a defender should do is intimate that the aggressor’s forces would only face a very limited ‘disarming’ that would leave the defended ally exposed to the aggressor’s immediate or subsequent retaliation. The defender absolutely must be able to demonstrate that he possesses the capability and will to severely and enduringly injure the aggressor’s military potential. An aggressor will likely claim at the end of the conflict that the defender failed to summarily defeat his forces or prevent them from achieving at least some of their war objectives. The amount of ruin inflicted on the aggressor's military must make it clear to all that the aggressor's gains, if any, were Pyrrhic. The defender's conventional deterrent should be structured accordingly.

Another important caveat is that a punitive conventional deterrent structured around the prospect of unleashing irregular forces (including mobilized civilian insurgent groups, paramilitaries, or foreign proxy groups) against the opponent’s military forces in the field or on his own soil likely will not carry the same credibility as a deterrent that primarily rests on regular conventional forces. The opponent’s leaders might base their calculus overwhelmingly if not exclusively on traditional force-on-force comparisons; the defender's irregular force potential might be downplayed or overlooked. The opponent’s leaders might also only base their decision-making on the prospects of conquest and not on ‘what comes afterwards.’ Irregular forces probably have more deterrence utility after an opponent’s aggression is already underway, as they might contribute to convincing the opponent’s leaders that future aggression against the defender might not be worth the pain. Even so, their limited destructiveness compared to regular forces suggest that their efforts would take considerable time and cumulative inflicted pain to significantly affect the opponent’s decision-making. It would seem that irregular forces have the most value not as a deterrent, but rather as a tool of compellence that induces the opponent to yield in his efforts to subjugate the defender’s territory.

All in all, even though denial remains the stronger form of conventional deterrence in theory, it might be patently obvious that a defender would not be able to prevent an opponent from achieving some set of military objectives through aggression. If this is the case, the more the defender could convey that the costs and pain inflicted on the opponent's military would be high as well as lasting, the greater the chance an opportunistic opponent might opt to pass on aggression.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. 

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[1] See Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters 39 (Autumn 2009): 38; and Edward Rhodes, “Conventional Deterrence,” Comparative Strategy 19 (Fall 2000): 225, 248.