The Large-Deck Carrier: Part 2

Part I available here

The Carrier-Surface Combatant Relationship

Yesterday I talked a bit about large-deck carriers' traditional doctrinal roles in helping obtain localized, temporary sea control for naval battleforces. In particular, I noted how the air wing historically served as the outer screen in a battleforce's layered defenses. The battleforce ordnance inventory management challenge represents a major reason why this is so. 

Battleforces need to be able to hold their own against fierce opposition while operating within a combat theater, even if those operations are designed to last only a few days at most. They may need to fight their way into the most hotly-contested areas during a major war, and it is quite likely they will need to fight their way back out. Shipboard offensive and defensive missile expenditures during combat operations consequently may be considerable. While it is critically important that the U.S. Navy soon develop means for replenishing shipboard vertical launchers underway, it nevertheless seems highly unlikely that the reloading process (or the associated logistical support ships) would be risked in ‘frontline’ areas where the threat of minimal-warning attack by the adversary was high.[i] In contrast, large-deck carrier ordnance magazines are sized to permit continuous, agile ‘reloading’ of a battleforce’s outer screening layers throughout multi-day combat operations. As in the past, doctrine and tactics can define the battleforce’s division of sea control labor between the air wing and surface combatants such that the latter’s missile expenditures are economized as possible to sustain battleforce operations for several days under heavy opposition.

For illustrative purposes, let’s say the main contested zone at the beginning of a maritime conflict between the U.S. and another great power stretched out as far as 1500nm from the latter’s coast.[ii] At or beyond this zone’s periphery, U.S. battleforce operations would focus on defending the maritime lines of communication to theater allies’ rear-area bases and commercial hubs. Within the zone’s outer or middle sections, battleforce tasks might include raids designed to seduce and attrite enemy maritime forces, disrupt enemy operations, or serve as feints supporting friendly operations elsewhere. Contested zone operations might not only be conducted as sea control-enabling precursors for subsequent power projection operations, but also might be used to maintain or reestablish lines of communication to isolated frontline forces and territories resisting the enemy’s offensive. They might even be used to temporarily dispute or deny the enemy’s sea control in select frontline areas; for example, to situationally support friendly submarine operations by harrassing or suppressing enemy Anti-Submarine Warfare forces. Destroying enemy maritime forces at their bases is certainly preferable in theory, but if this is not possible for military or political reasons, the use of brief operations that strive to selectively draw them into battle at sea under conditions favoring friendly forces is next best.

Major war operations would be shaped by how the relative threat within the operational area, the number of high campaign-value forces available in the theater, and the campaign objectives driving any given operation meshed with the theater commander’s risk tolerances. Under many scenarios, the necessary size of a sea control ‘moving bubble’ and the amount of friendly firepower that must be massed within it may require dispersed yet mutually-supporting multi-carrier task forces as was envisioned in Cold War operational concepts.[iii] In tactical situations where the risks posed to carriers are judged by the theater commander to be excessive, it is conceivable that multi-mission Surface Action Groups (SAG) detached from or independent of carrier groups might be sent forward as raiders with sea control/denial or power projection tasks. Should this occur, carrier-based fighters—supported by battleforce-organic Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and aerial refueling assets, with augmentation by land-based AEW and tanker aircraft as possible—might screen SAGs throughout their contested zone missions. Carrier-based fighters might likewise be sortied forward if a SAG makes heavy contact with adversary forces, or be used to cover an ordnance-depleted SAG’s retirement from the contested zone. The same would be true for providing similar support to maritime forces operating at the ‘frontline’ at the beginning of a war.[iv] Fighters based on land within the contested zone could also render this support, but because their doing so would be predicated on their basing’s survivability and logistical lines of communications’ defensibility, carrier-based fighter support remains a necessary hedge within operational plans.

The key takeaway from this discussion should be that U.S. battleforce operations should not be conceived as singular ‘charges of the light brigade’ deep within the contested zone at the beginning of a war followed by the establishment of long-duration ‘frontline sanctuaries’ for carrier operations. Rather, they should be conceived as sequential (or if multiple task forces are involved, perhaps parallel) hit-and-run operations that gradually degrade an adversary’s ability to fight effectively in the contested zone’s outer sections, which in turn creates the conditions that allow the process to be repeated for the zone’s middle sections.

Tomorrow, the air wing's single most important aircraft

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[i] Jan Van Tol, et. al. “AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept.” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), 40, 46-47.

[ii] Ibid, 21-22. It is important to note the zone would likely begin to collapse inward as U.S. operations against the adversary’s oceanic surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities begin to bite. For context, see Jonathan F. Solomon. “Maritime Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks.” Naval War College Review 66, No. 4 (Autumn 2013): 87-116.

[iii] Hattendorf, 74, 126, 292.

[iv] Solomon, 98, 114.

The Large-Deck Carrier: Doctrinal Roles and Campaign-Level Value

The large-deck aircraft carrier is predominantly associated with power projection ashore. This traces from U.S. Navy carrier air wings’ widespread post-Second World War use for conventional strike operations as well as for providing direct support to ground forces. Indeed, the most common criticisms against the large-deck carrier’s future utility are that potential adversaries’ rapidly expanding maritime denial capabilities, the presently-programmed air wing’s constrained combat radius, and long-range anti-ship missiles’ comparatively low lifecycle costs per target render carriers overly-vulnerable and expensive fleet assets with insufficient tactical reach.

The problem with these arguments is that the large-deck carrier’s wartime value cannot be accurately assessed outside a major maritime campaign’s holistic context. Doing so not only reveals that large-deck carriers’ survivability can be quite high if the combined arms doctrine governing their employment intelligently accounts for risk, but also that the carrier air wing’s innate capabilities will be indispensable in helping U.S. Navy forces obtain and then exercise localized sea control when and where operationally necessary. Such an assessment also suggests that carriers will play crucial roles supporting Joint power projection operations, and should a war become protracted, carriers will likely have to assume a significant share of the Joint force’s strike tasks if an American campaign’s operational tempo is to be sustained.

Carriers and Sea Control

A naval force’s execution of any task, power projection or otherwise, is predicated on it securing control of the localized sea area from which the task must be performed. This localized control is not (and cannot practically be) permanent; it only must be maintained as long as necessary to complete the task.[i] Occasionally control must be obtained over a relatively fixed area, such as when a force is supporting a major amphibious assault. A fixed area is also desirable when the choice is made to maximize aircraft sortie-rate efficiency during routinized overland operations, though this can only be done at low risk when the threats facing the force are minimal. Most commonly, though, sea control occurs as a localized ‘moving bubble’ of maritime superiority as a force maneuvers along its voyage route or within a large operating area.

It is easy to take localized sea control for granted, especially considering the U.S. Navy secured it practically by default during each of its post-1945 combat operations. The Cold War-era U.S. Navy harbored no illusions, however, regarding the sea control challenges it would have faced in forward areas as well as along allies’ oceanic lines of communication had there been a direct clash with the Soviet Union. In fact, the 1980s Maritime Strategy’s much-debated concept for surface operations within the Soviet maritime periphery was explicitly conditioned on the margin of sea control obtainable in any given area at any given time in a hypothetical major war.[ii] Similarly, Second World War U.S. Navy power projection in the Pacific was overwhelmingly tied to the fleet’s ability to attain localized sea control in support of each individual sequential operation. As such, it is worth noting U.S. Navy battleforce operations within Japanese home waters did not begin until February 1945, and even then consisted primarily of hit-and-run land-attack raids due to residual Japanese sea denial capabilities. In both these historical cases, large-deck carrier air wings’ screening, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities figured prominently in securing the localized sea control needed for power projection tasks.

It is true that from December 1941 through the early 1980s, the large-deck carrier’s primary sea control role supporting power projection was to protect itself from attack. This was because carriers, by virtue of hosting the air wing’s strike aircraft, represented the fleet’s core land-attack assets. The other warships within a carrier group therefore served almost exclusively as defensive screens.

The U.S. Navy’s fielding of the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile altered this arrangement. Launchable by submarines and surface combatants alike, Tomahawk permitted striking power’s distribution throughout a dispersed battleforce. What did not change, though, was surface combatants’ reliance on the carrier’s air wing for outer layer screening support. This support was especially crucial when sufficiently dense, timely, or persistent land-based air support for screening was unavailable—a common condition within contested forward zones or mid-oceanic areas. Only the air wing under such circumstances could intercept massed multi-axis maritime aircraft raids hundreds of miles away from a battleforce, and thereby reduce the number of inbound anti-ship missiles that friendly surface combatants had to defend against. Likewise, only the air wing could rapidly respond to a brief detection of an enemy submarine beyond a few tens of miles from a battleforce’s warships when land-based anti-submarine support was excessively distant. Perhaps most significantly, only the air wing could persistently seek out and neutralize adversary surveillance/reconnaissance patrols far beyond the latter’s maximum effective range for detecting and classifying a battleforce warships—or for uncovering the battleforce’s deception and concealment efforts.

The air wing’s outer layer screening role has not evaporated. Instead, it has been tacitly deemphasized over the past two decades of relatively-unopposed U.S. Navy operations. Aegis surface combatants, the middle layer of 1980s battleforce air defenses, largely became the de facto post-Cold War outer layer due to the vastly reduced threat. Carrier and surface combatant-based helicopters likewise served as a battleforce’s sole anti-submarine ‘pouncers’ when land-based fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft were unavailable.

These assignments will likely remain adequate for most contingencies involving lesser powers, though U.S. Navy battleforces’ standoff distances from land during a crisis or a war’s early phases may need to be situationally increased somewhat to complicate such an adversary’s surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting tasks. In contrast, the post-Cold War battleforce screening ‘status quo’ will not be adequate for contingencies involving great powers who possess theater-wide sea denial capabilities. Under such circumstances, and notwithstanding its continuing role providing support to maritime ground force operations, the air wing will need to reassert its historical doctrinal role as a battleforce’s primary outer layer screen.

Tomorrow, the doctrinal relationships between carriers and surface combatants

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[i] Julian S. Corbett. Principles of Maritime Strategy. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 100-102, 202, 268.

[ii] John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds. “Naval War College Newport Papers 33: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s.” (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, December 2008), 82, 85, 176, 178, 183, 185, 216, 219, 297, 320-321. Of interest, early 1980s U.S. Navy war games conducted in support of the maritime strategy’s development suggested carrier groups could exploit Soviet strategy and doctrine by serving as an at-sea ‘force-in-being’ that tied down sizable Soviet air forces during a major conflict. Carriers performing this role would operate in forward North Atlantic areas firmly controlled by NATO. See John B. Hattendorf. “Naval War College Newport Papers 19: Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986.” (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, December 2004), 35.

Zhuhai airshow and other PLAAF news

The time around Zhuhai air show is always interesting for PLA followers, because we see a whole bunch of new models displayed. This year was no different. A lot of pictures of different PGMs, ground attack missiles, army vehicles and air defense systems came out before the show even started. In many ways, Zhuhai is more like a defense exhibition rather than an air show. All of these systems are displayed for export purposes and many of them will never serve in PLA. The two items that attracted the most attention were FC-31 and Y-20.

For the latter, we saw pictures of it next to C-17 and IL-76. It was quite interesting also to see the current medium transport Y-9 side by side with Y-20's prototype 783. We also found out that a Y-30 turboprop medium transport is coming out to either replace Y-9 or compliment Y-9/Y-20. Either way, there is good progress in this area for China that has long been needed. The bigger issue is whether or not AVIC1 can build up the industrial capabilities to produce large numbers of this class of transport. American aerospace companies are far more technologically advanced than AVIC1. Just as significantly, Boeing and Lockheed has the ability to mass produce large numbers of aircraft that AVIC1 currently simply do not have the capacity to do. Lockheed can produce well over 100 F-35 a year in the future and have the ability to produce 500 F-16s a year. CAC produces around 50 J-10s in a high production year. Chinese naval shipyard have been able to produce large number of high quality ships because domestic shipyards have developed very advanced shipbuilding capabilities as well as high quality management from all of the civilian shipbuilding projects. As a result of the COMAC's C-919 and ARJ-21 project, China's aerospace industry will also develop greater industrial capability to produce airliners. AS this is happening, AVIC1 subsidiaries are developing more efficient production and assembly process. It will be interesting to watch how well this affect the production of Y-20 transport, new UAVs and next generation fighter jets.

FC-31 definitely drew more attention from the Western press. It's always amusing for me to read eye catching headlines about a jet that we have seen for a couple of years. Thankfully, there were a couple of articles that got me to think a little more. Reuben Johnson from JDW wrote a CNN article that is rather unflattering on FC-31. He was not very high on the flight performance of the jet. I think he is making a rather presumptuous judgement here, because this is quite a concept demonstration mule as I've explained in the past. Based on the picture of the FC-31 model from the air show, David Axe has already written an article on War is boring on what could change on FC-31. From air show interview, it sounds like that both an export and domestic version of the aircraft will be developed. The latter case is dependent on PLAAF orders. I would think that if this proof of concept aircraft did not achieve the desired flight performance of PLAAF, SAC would have to go back to the drawing board and make some serious changes. When J-20 project came out with its demonstrator prototypes, it was already a PLAAF sanctioned project, so 2 flying prototypes + probably 2 static prototypes were built to be tested out before they went through the major incremental change with the appearance of No. 2011. When one thinks about, it's quite an impressive achievement to go from conceptual prototypes to pre-production prototypes in just over 3 years. It looks like we will see at least 3 new J-20 prototypes this year with the possibility of a 4th one. The J-20 is really making a big push this year. In comparison, FC-31 may go through a major redesign just to satisfy PLAAF requirements and then another big change to correct the issues found in the first redesign. We've seen this with Soaring Dragon UAV project where CAC/GAIC made siginficant changes based on issues found in the demonstrator aircraft. The change was so large that I thought a new UAV project came out when the redesigned aircraft came out. Regardless of Chinese bbs speculations, FC-31 is years away due to lack of appropriate engine options for the next few years. I would think it to be prudent to take the time to make sure the final design achieves all of PLAAF requirements.

Outside of the air show aircraft, we also saw some interesting movement with production aircraft. It looks like we have finally detected a first operational unit of J-10B aircraft. Although the unit numbers are smudged in the photos, these first production J-10B looks to be forming a new FTTC brigade (maybe Brigade No. 169). That is not too surprising since J-10A also joined FTTC before the first operational regiment was established in 44th division. Enough J-10B have been produced in this first batch for 2 operational units, so I would imagine the first non-FTTC unit would also be established this year. The first batch of J-10Bs should all be using AL-31FN series 3 engines which have increased service life and thrust over the earlier series. In a recent interview with 606th Institute rep at the Zhuhai air show, it was claimed that a 14000 kgf thrust version of WS-10 engine have been developed that may be installed on J-10B in the future. If that version is in production, it would represent an engine option that's competitive with what the Russians are offering, so we may finally see J-10B installed with domestic options in the future. Continued improvement in WS-10 engine would also be very helpful to the J-20 program.

The other interesting development is the first production brigade of GJ-1 (Wing Loong) UAV with 151st brigade. Huitong's website claims this brigade is with FTTC and was operational for this year's SCO military exercises. The development timeline of GJ-1 project is quite interesting. We first saw Wing Loong (aka Yilong) display in 2008 Zhuhai airshow. At that time, it had already made its maiden flight in 2007 and conducted flight & ordinance testing. We continued to see its displays in 2009 to 2011 with some major modifications like the appearance of head bulge similar to RQ-4. By the time we saw the production version in 2012 airshow, it came with ground attack weapons, air attack missiles, E/O sensors, Satcom antenna and ground control station. UAE was already identified as the first export customer. Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan have also purchased unknown numbers. So from the first flight of demonstrator to induction into PLAAF takes about 6 years. It could be shorter for export opportunities depending on the needs of the customer. If we translate this timeline to CAC's Soar Dragon HALE UAV project, the China hawk would join service around 2017. The even more advanced Lijian UCAV project from SAC first flew last year and might join service by the end of this decade. Out of all the UAV projects, Lijian UCAV maybe the most important going forward. It is probably dependent on the success of the WS-13 turbofan engine and also the next generation engine designed for FC-31. The recurring theme here is that the WS-13 engine developed for JF-17 project (and can be used by other project) has unknown status even after years of development. The next generation engine of this class has lower priority than WS-15 and is years away from completion.

So as usual, a lot of interesting development, but domestic engine options are holding them back.

The Chinese DF-21 Arsenal: The Finale

For previous installments, see Parts I, II, and III

Future Uncertainties

These raid-sizing thought experiments make a convincing case that, at present, the conventionally-armed DF-21 inventory is only capable of performing specific tasks within an overall combined arms first strike. At the inventory’s mid-2013 size, any margin for maintaining a campaign-waging missile reserve dissipates quickly if the missiles are less effective or U.S. BMD more effective than our thought experiments’ assumptions.

It is less clear whether the inventory is actually solely intended for the first strike role, or whether the PLA has broader long-term ambitions for these missiles. The apparent plateaus in DF-21C deployments after 2009 and DF-21D deployments after 2011 could mean that only short productions runs were needed because the PLA only needed a few tens of these missiles to meet their first strike-centric inventory requirements for 1500+ kilometer MRBMs over the near-to-intermediate term. This interpretation would be consistent with NASIC’s January 2014 assessment that the PLA’s C² capabilities are currently sufficient only for conducting “pre-planned joint fires against fixed targets in the Pacific Theater,” and that coordinated strikes against “pop-up targets of opportunity” in a dynamic combat environment would likely face “considerable difficulties, except in certain tactical situations.”[i] In other words, the PLA would presently gain little from reserving some sizable number of conventionally-armed MRBMs for campaign-waging instead of expending them within a coordinated combined arms first strike.

Alternatively, it might mean that the -21C and -21D are limited ‘test runs’ of conventionally-armed 1500+ kilometer MRBMs, and that technological as well as operational lessons-learned generated by the deployed brigades will be applied in either future DF-21 variants or new-design MRBMs. It might even mean that -21C and/or -21D production was prematurely ended due to critical performance issues or capability limitations discovered during operational testing, and that the roles one or both were intended to fill will either remain gapped until successor designs are fielded—or the roles are reallocated to other combat arms.

This leaves the question of whether the PLA has fulfilled its long-term inventory requirements for conventionally-armed 1500+ kilometer MRBMs with the -21C and -21D, meaning that it will only periodically introduce new-design missiles in this class to replace those already fielded, or whether it is undergoing a ‘build a little, test a little, learn a lot’ sequence in which a second production wave will expand the arsenal in this range-class further. If the first hypothesis is true, then it seems virtually certain the PLA only plans to use these missiles in a first strike role. If the second is true, then this would suggest an additional future campaign-waging role.

It will be extremely difficult to test these hypotheses going forward, however, if the annual DOD reports continue their post-2012 trend of not providing standalone inventory size estimates for the DF-21 series. The same will be true if they do not begin providing estimates for the DF-16 series or any future new-design MRBMs that may be deployed. As NASIC presently only reports TEL counts, the annual DOD reports serve as the only authoritative resource for missile counts. In their absence, the U.S. security studies community will be left relying solely on Chinese-language open sources of varying fidelity, which may impact analysts’ abilities to accurately inform the East Asian security debate. The PLA conventionally-armed MRBM arsenal’s size, composition, and growth trends are critical metrics for gauging Chinese doctrine, operational plans, and strategic intentions. Consequently, if non-governmental analysts are left unable to annually monitor the arsenal, it may become more difficult for U.S. and allied leaders to obtain opinion elites’ and the general public’s support for competitive strategies that hinge on popular appreciation of the dangers these and other similar PLA capabilities pose to U.S. conventional deterrence in East Asia.

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[i] Fuell, 10.

Letter from Flag/General Officers to Congress from NavyNow

The Navy is in trouble.  It's shipbuilding budget is insufficient to retain the force size it is now, let alone its planned size.  Deployment lengths are increasing, wearing out both Sailor/Marine and equipment.  Platforms are not getting the maintenance, upkeep, and modernization they desperately need.  The time for action is now.

NavyNow is a group begun in order to raise awareness on the Hill and among the American Public that the resources currently allocated to build, operate, and maintain the Navy that is planned are insufficient to that task.  This is not a call for a larger Navy; it is a call to adequately fund the one we have.  I am serving as a policy adviser to NavyNow.

Today, NavyNow sent the following letter signed by 95 Flag and General Officers to key Members of Congress.  Clearly there will be those who dismiss this letter as the self-serving parochialism of a bunch of frustrated officers.  This would be a mistake.  These men and women bring considerable judgment and experience to the question of the adequacy of resources devoted to American
Seapower, and their collective dismay is reflected below.

Bryan McGrath

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November 12, 2024

Letter to Congress

As retired Admirals and Generals who have had the privilege of leading our military forces, we write to express our concern that the United States Department of the Navy is underfunded and overextended, placing our national defense, our Sailors and Marines, and the stability of the global economy at risk.

We urge Congress to provide the full funding the Department of the Navy needs for ships and aircraft, personnel, maintenance, training and operations.During times of war, peace and those periods that defy conventional labels, United States naval forces play a unique role in defending our national security and projecting American force, influence and assistance around the world. We know the critical function served by the forward-deployed naval forces in countering threats from our enemies, promoting regional stability and responding to humanitarian crises.

In peacetime, the Navy-Marine Corps team provides a sense of security to regions around the world that allows national economies, free trade practices and democracies to flourish. In times of danger for our nation and our allies, the Navy-Marine Corps team brings swift and lethal responses to our enemies.The Department of the Navy is able to engage in numerous and diverse missions because it is flexible and forward-deployed. The fleet can quickly go anywhere and can work from international waters, uninhibited by foreign authority. The Department of the Navy will always respond with an enthusiastic “can do” whenever asked to take on a mission.

In the past year alone, United States naval forces have been called upon to:

• Launch the first combat strikes that halted the advancement of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
•  Demonstrate U.S. support for partner nations around the Black Sea to promote peace and stability.
• Deliver disaster relief to victims of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.
• Combat pirates off the coast of Africa.
• Provide support to our forces in Afghanistan.
• Pressure Bashar al-Assad into giving up Syria’s chemical weapon supply.
• Fly crisis response forces for long-distance rescue operations in Sudan and Iraq.

The Department of the Navy’s mission will continue to be demanding as the nation confronts
unpredictable and varied challenges around the world. We are concerned that if the Department of the Navy is required to continue to respond to crisis after crisis without the funding needed to build new ships, repair old equipment and provide routine maintenance to existing equipment, the nation risks permanent damage to our national defense and negative impacts on the domestic and international economies that rely on the safety and security that U.S. sea power provides.

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) and its accompanying strike group completed two back-to-back deployments with only a two-month break in between. The USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group recently completed its second extended deployment in 18 months. The Chief of Naval Operations has called these extended deployments “unsustainable.”

Ships, crews and equipment cannot continue the current pace of operations, and the retention of
trained personnel will suffer, ultimately leading to reduced readiness for combat and other missions.
Additional funding is designed to do nothing more than provide the Navy-Marine Corps team the
resources required to perform critical operations around the world. The increase in funding will support the implementation of our nation’s maritime security strategy, allowing the Navy and Marines to continue their first-line role in protecting our nation’s vital interests.  Increased funding will enable the Navy-Marine Corps team to:

•  Build and maintain the 306 ships required (an increase from 289 today).
• Continue to provide vital combat support to our forces wherever they may be engaged.
• Update and maintain existing aircraft, invest in new designs and continue with critical modernization programs.
• Restore the fleet maintenance schedule that has been badly disrupted by 13 years of war combined with severe reductions in the number of ships.
• Replenish weapons inventories to required levels.
• Invest in the next-generation capabilities necessary for the Navy to remain relevant in the future.

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces deployed on the oceans of the world are highly effective in deterring those nations and ideologies that would threaten the geopolitical and economic security of our country and the security of our allies.

As China and Russia modernize and greatly expand their navies’ operations at sea, we know that we
must act now, and we request your strong support.Thank you for your time and consideration of our request.

Sincerely,

ADM Stan Arthur, USN (Ret.)
ADM Jim Busey, USN (Ret.)
ADM Archie Clemins, USN (Ret.)
GEN James Conway, USMC (Ret.)
ADM Leon A. "Bud" Edney, USN (Ret.)
ADM Tom Fargo, USN (Ret.)
ADM Mark Fitzgerald, USN (Ret.)
ADM Bobby Inman, USN (Ret.)
ADM Jerry Johnson, USN (Ret.)
ADM Bob Kelly, USN (Ret.)
ADM Joe Lopez, USN (Ret.)
ADM James "Ace" Lyons, Jr. , USN (Ret.)
GEN Robert Magnus, USMC (Ret.)
ADM Henry Mauz, USN (Ret.)
ADM Snuffy Smith, USN (Ret.)
ADM Steven White, USN (Ret.)
VADM Phil Balisle, USN (Ret.)
VADM Gerald Beaman, USN (Ret.)
VADM Brent Bennitt, USN (Ret.)
VADM Bill Bowes, USN (Ret.)
VADM Edward Briggs, USN (Ret.)
VADM Nancy Brown, USN (Ret.)
VADM Mike Bucchi, USN (Ret.)
VADM Al Burkhalter, USN (Ret.)
VADM E. M. Chanik, USN (Ret.)
VADM Edward Clexton, USN (Ret.)
VADM Daniel L. Cooper, USN (Ret.)
VADM John Cotton, USN (Ret.)
VADM Lou Crenshaw, USN (Ret.)
VADM Walt Davis, USN (Ret.)
VADM Dirk J. Debbink, USNR (Ret.)
VADM Jay Donnelly, USN (Ret.)
VADM Robert Dunn, USN (Ret.)
VADM Bill Earner, USN (Ret.)
VADM Terry Etnyre, USN (Ret.)
VADM Malcolm Fages, USN (Ret.)
VADM Jim Fitzgerald, USN (Ret.)
VADM Paul Gaffney, USN (Ret.)
VADM Dick Gallagher, USN (Ret.)
VADM Hank Giffin, USN (Ret.)
VADM Kevin Green, USN (Ret.)
VADM Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.)
VADM Al Harms, USN (Ret.)
VADM Diego Hernandez, USN (Ret.)
VADM Paul Ilg, USN (Ret.)
VADM Bernard Kauderer, USN (Ret.)
VADM Tom Kilcline, USN (Ret.)
VADM Douglas J. Katz, USN (Ret)
VADM Tony Less, USN (Ret.)
VADM John Lockard, USN (Ret.)
VADM Stephen F. Loftus, USN (Ret.)
VADM Martin Mayer, USN (Ret.)
VADM John Mazach, USN (Ret.)
VADM Justin McCarthy, USN (Ret.)
VADM William F. McCauley, USN (Ret.)
VADM J. Kevin Moran, USN (Ret.)
VADM John Nyquist, USN (Ret.)
VADM Dan Oliver, USN (Ret.)
VADM Douglas C. Plate, USN (Ret.)
VADM Carol Pottenger, USN (Ret.)
VADM Phil Quast, USN (Ret.)
VADM J. A. Sagerholm, USN (Ret.)
VADM Robert Spane, USN (Ret.)
VADM George Sterner, USN (Ret.)
VADM Ron Thunman, USN (Ret.)
VADM John Totushek, USN (Ret.)
RADM Joseph J. Barth , USN (Ret.)
RADM Nevin Carr, USN (Ret.)
RADM William W. Cobb, USN (Ret.)
RADM Tom Eccles, USN (Ret.)
RADM John B. Foley III, USN (Ret.)
RADM Bill Goodwin, USN (Ret.)
RADM David Hart, USN (Ret.)
RADM Jim Hinkle, USN (Ret.)
RADM Francis K. Holian, USN (Ret.)
RADM Dan Holloway, USN (Ret.)
RADM Joe Horn, USN (Ret.)
RADM Pierce Johnson, USN (Ret.)
RADM Corky Lenox, USN (Ret.)
RADM Thomas Lilly, USN (Ret.)
RADM Terence McKnight, USN (Ret.)
RADM Thomas Mercer, USN (Ret.)
RADM Stephen S. Oswald, USN (Ret.)
RADM W.L. Putnam, USN (Ret.)
RADM Harry Quast, USN (Ret.)
RADM David G. Ramsey, USN (Ret.)
RADM Robert A. Ravitz, USNR (Ret.)
RADM Bob Sutton, USN (Ret.)
RADM Ronald Tucker, USN (Ret.)
RADM Don Weiss, USN (Ret.)
RDML Kenneth Barausky, USN (Ret.)
RDML Peter H. Beckwith, USN (Ret.)
RDML Ronald Henderson, USN (Ret.)
RDML Thomas Irwin, USN (Ret.)
RDML Deborah Loewer, USN (Ret.)
RDML Yank Rutherford, USN (Ret.)