Following in the Wake of the Frigate; Remarkable Continuity in the Postwar US Surface Combatant Force

The truncation of the Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS) to 32 units, and subsequent search for a more “lethal” and “survivable” combatant has triggered a useful discussion on the shape of the future U.S. surface combatant fleet. Captain Arthur H. Barber’s “Rethinking the Future Fleet” in this month’s Naval Institute Proceedings is especially insightful on this topic. Senior civilian and military leaders should however first look back on the last 60+ years before discussing issues of lethality and survivability for future warships. U.S. surface warships of all sizes from the 15,000 ton Zumwalt class destroyer to the 3000 ton Littoral Combatant ship are all descendents of the frigates (DLG) built just after the end of the Second World War. A combination of a new operational concept, new threats at sea, and rapidly advancing technology combined to create a persistent design in U.S. surface combatants that endures to the present day. The postwar surface combatant has been primarily assigned as a defensive platform based on the experience of World War 2 and those that followed in Vietnam. Its design features the primacy of sensory, communication and weapons control equipment over stout construction and armor. It was specifically designed to support defensive rather than offensive missions. These features have been a constant in a parade of ships that have entered the fleet from 1947 to 2014. If senior national security decision makers desire greater lethality and enhanced survivability in future surface combatants, the characteristics so prevalent in U.S. warship design since the late 1940’s must be re-evaluated.

USS Savannah hit by German glide bomb (Navsource.org)

 The Experience of War

    

      The experience of World War 2 fundamentally changed the characteristics of postwar construction surface combatants. Aircraft; early guided weapons like the German Fritz X glide bomb and the Japanese kamikaze; and underwater threats were recognized as more significant threats to the fleet than surface gunfire. The Combat Information Center (CIC) that had originated during the war was improved and expanded to support a higher volume of more accurate fire in defense of the new capital ship-designate aircraft carrier. Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) historian CAPT. David Boslaugh quotes Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Earnest King’s 1945 statement that explains this problem. The CNO was troubled about the inability to rapidly process data and said, “The display of information was slow, complicated, and incomplete, rendering it difficult for the human mind to grasp the situation.” The solution in King’s mind was to optimize the CIC for automated reception and dissemination of actionable fire control data to own ship weapons and other members of a formation. From 1945 onward surface warships would be designed around this defensive role in protecting carriers and other high value units from both air and underwater attack.

The 1945 Bikini Atoll "Abel" Test, Wikipedia

     The advent of nuclear weapons further changed warship design as they made all but the largest and best protected ship vulnerable to immediate destruction. The Bikini atoll nuclear weapon tests (ABEL and BAKER) of 1945 indicated that armor might protect the ship from sinking, but was relatively useless in protecting the lives of the crew. A goat tethered inside a 14 inch gun turret of the former battleship USS Nevada survived the blast, as did the ship, but died two weeks later of radiation sickness. Warship designers envisioned a nuclear attack rapidly turning a fleet of heavily armored units into ghost ships with dead crews. The countermeasure wash down system developed in the wake of these tests might protect against fallout accumulation, but armor was useless in the face of massive doses of gamma radiation.

The Rise of the Missile Frigate (DLG)

USS Norfolk (DL 1), Navsource.org

     The first postwar U.S. surface combatant reflected the combination of new threats. The USS Norfolk (DL-1), designed as a “hunter killer” with dual anti-air and anti-submarine warfare missions was the predecessor to dozens of similar warships that followed. This dual mission focus combined a light cruiser sized hull and destroyer weapons and machinery. The usual light cruiser five inch armor belt was eschewed and lightweight aluminum superstructure construction was embraced in order to support larger and more complex radar and communications equipment. While the Norfolk proved too expensive to mass produce in 1947, increased defense spending in the 1950’s at the outset of the Cold War fueled the construction of her missile-armed descendents. Similar ships such as the conventionally-powered Farragut, Leahy and Belknap classes followed, as did nuclear-powered variants Bainbridge, Truxtun, and the California and Virginia classes. The DLG concept was validated in the service of these ships as Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone (PIRAZ) ship during the Vietnam War. The DLG’s Sterett and Biddle armed with Terrier missiles proved as capable as the much larger guided missile cruisers like the converted gun cruiser Chicago and the purpose-built Long Beach in combating North Vietnamese aircraft.

USS Biddle (DLG 34) Navsource.org

A Homogeneous Defensive Fleet

     The DLG’s role as the principle postwar surface combatant model was further strengthened by the retirement of the World War 2 construction guided missile cruisers. The perceived “cruiser gap” between the respective numbers of U.S. and Soviet warships bearing the “cruiser” title caused the reclassification of four out of five DLG groups as guided missile cruisers (CG). The DLG’s were similar in size and capability to Soviet cruisers, making the change a reasonable choice. This relabeling of the DLG was significant in that it assumed the title, but not the perceived survivability embodied in the cruiser term.

     Other classes of surface combatant built in the postwar era followed the precedent set by the DLG and grew in size to support their part of the defensive mission. Destroyers, from the Forrest Sherman class of 1953 through the Spruance class that served until the last decade were optimized to support larger and more capable CIC’s and their associated communication and weapons direction equipment. Smaller destroyer escorts from the first postwar Dealey class through the now retiring Oliver Hazard Perry’s saw an expansion of their electronics capacity for antisubmarine warfare.

The original DDG 47 seen here with never-built Virginia
class AEGIS variant (an actual cruiser design)

     The entry of AEGIS-equipped warships and subsequent combatants to the fleet continued the postwar trend in surface warship construction. The AEGIS-equipped nuclear strike cruiser (CSGN), the successor platform to the retired World War 2-cruisers, was cancelled in the late 1970’s by the Carter administration due to excessive costs. Its low end, conventionally powered variant, the DDG-47 however survived as the rerated CG-47 Ticonderoga class cruiser due to its command and control capabilities, heavy surface to air missile (SAM) armament and ability to host a flag staff. The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class was rated as a destroyer vice a cruiser for its lack of similar capabilities as compared to the Ticonderoga’s. The Zumwalt class (DDG 1000) is as large as a late World War 2 cruiser, but it too appears to be essentially a large destroyer-type vessel. At 1/5 the Zumwalt’s displacement, the LCS might not appear at first to fit the model. Like its larger sisters however, it has a small crew, relies on stealth and self defense weapons rather than armor, and has a lightweight construction similar to other postwar U.S. surface combatants.

USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) maneuvers with USS
Freedom (LCS 1), US Navy photo

 Classification as a Measure of “Survivability”

     All current combatants (cruisers, destroyers, frigates and LCS) are similar descendents of Norfolk and the DLG “frigate” classes that followed. Like Norfolk, current surface combatants are fundamentally defensive in mission and principally equipped to protect high value units from air, missile, and underwater attack. LCS may eventually have a more “offensive” mission, but remains defensive for the present. All four classes of combatant are dependent on defensive systems rather than actual armor or structural components for survivability. The U.S. Navy separates the LCS and the FFG from the CG and DDG in its current survivability rating system. The history of the last six decades however would seem to warn that classification should be used with great care as an indicator of “survivability”. The Ticonderoga class cruiser, the Freedom and Independence LCS sea frames and even the large Zumwalt class DDG 1000 are differing examples of the same design ethos that has dominated U.S. surface combatant design since 1945. Any discussion of surface combatant “survivability” must take into account this basic similarity among U.S. surface warships. The days of significant “physical” differences between surface combatant types have been over for a very long time.    

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"Asia Pivot Requires Better Maritime Defenses," by Emil Maine (Real Clear Defense, 04/28/14)

"Upcoming Budget Crunch Could Unravel New Deployment Plan," by David Larter (Navy Times, 04/28/14)

"House Committee Seeks to Stall UCLASS Program Pending New Pentagon Un-manned Aviation Study," by Sam LaGrone and Dave Majumdar (USNI News, 04/29/14)

"What to do with those Eleven Cruisers," by Lazarus (Information Dissemination, 04/29/14)

"Save the Carrier, Sink the LCS," by Everett Pyatt (Real Clear Defense, 04/30/14)

"Obama's Pivot to Asia Will Lack Firepower," by Kristina Wong (The Hill, 04/30/14)

"Navy Asks Industry for Input on Follow-on for Littoral Combat Ship," by Sam LaGrone (USNI News, 05/01/14)

"Attrition, Maneuver and Air-Sea Battle," by Adam Humayun (CIMSEC, 05/01/14)

"LCS Will Miss World's Largest Naval Exercise," by Chris Cavas (Defense News, 05/04/14)

Bryan McGrath

VADM Francis R. "Frank" Donovan, USN (Ret.), Requiescat in Pace

VADM Francis R. Donovan, USN

Late in the Fall of 1991, VADM Frank Donovan, Commander of the Military Sealift Command, had a decision to make about hiring a new Flag Lieutenant.  Miltary Sealift Command had "made its bones" in the Gulf War earlier that year, ensuring that the half a million strong Desert Shield and Desert Storm forces were closed, supplied and sustained.  Donovan was at the top of his game, and as was the custom then, rated a LCDR as his aide, which is what he was replacing.  For some odd reason, the Surface Warfare shop sent my name in for consideration, even though at the time, I was a frocked Lieutenant (the horror).  So I drove up to the Navy Yard one day, figuring I'd get some interview experience for the day they send me into a bite sized one-or-two star where I'd be a better fit.

I can still remember how nervous I was, especially when I met the outgoing aide.  He was about six three, ramrod straight, the very picture of a perfect flag lieutenant.  As soon as I saw him, I knew there was no chance.  So I went into the interview with the Admiral thinking I had little to lose.

On the coffee table was a schematic, a print not unlike architectural plans.  Although I was looking at it upside down, with a short glance I could tell that it was the design for a large, marine boiler.  Admiral Donovan welcomed me and then said almost immediately, "what's that?" as he pointed at the schematic.  I suppose I hesitated a second, because he quickly interjected "nah, just kiding".  And then I answered--"it is a marine boiler, sir."  I had started the Navy as a boilers officer, and the components were readily discernible.  When he asked how I knew that, I told him about my first job--which incidentally, had been an early job of his.

"It doesn't get any better than this, Kid."

The interview did not last long, we shook hands and I left the office for the drive back to Norfolk, with little sense that I would get the job, but an incredibly positive assessment of one of the most senior men I had met in the Navy to that time.

You can guess the story.  I got the job, and it was a wonderful experience.  I never met a kinder, gentler man in the Navy, a man for whom the Sailor and the Marine were the highest reason for service.

The Admiral had eight kids, but he and Martha made me feel like one of their own.  I never knew how they all fit in that little house in Vienna, but they made it work and they made it work well.

One day, the Admiral walked into my office, adorned as was his custom in his "Navy Boxing" windbreaker. He said, "Sport (he generally called me Sport, Champ, or Kid), my picture fell off the CNO's piano."  I didn't immediately understand, so he spelled it out for me.  "The CNO just called, and I have to retire.  So that's what we'll be working on for the next couple of months."  It was a sad day for me, and I am sure it was for him too.  I know he would loved to have had another job.

Frank Donovan loved the Navy, the Naval Academy, the Marine Corps, Sailors, Marines, Mariners, and Gators.  I think he may have loved Gators best.  It was a sight to behold when he was among them, and the pride they had in each other's friendship and professionalism was strong.

I would see the Admiral yearly at Surface Navy Association symposiums.  He was always deeply engaged, always working on something important.  It was one of my favorite things about SNA shows.

I will miss him.

Bryan McGrath

052D's role in Chinese Navy

In my last blog entry, I looked over the future of PLAN surface combatant fleet. Part of the reason I did that is the emergency of the new Type 055 cruiser. For any future PLAN carrier group or expeditionary strike group, Type 052D will be expected as important escorts even with Type 055 in the fold. What roles can Type 052D and how will it be utilized by PLAN?

If we look at Type 052D’s ancestors Type 052C, we have a surface combatant that is clearly designed to provide area air defense. It is the first modern Chinese AAW ship that has advanced multi-functional radar system with Active guided long range SAM along with relative modern combat system. It is also expected by many to have an advanced AEGIS like combat system allowing engagements using inputs from sensors on different ships and aircraft. While it is also equipped with the advanced YJ-62 (also replaceable with LACM) and advanced sonar system (looks to be same Towed Array Sonar as on Type 054A), there is no question that the emphasis of the ship is for area air defense. Type 052C’s ancestor Type 052B can be looked at as a stepping stone from Type 052 to 052C. Its production stopped at 2, because Type 054A is cheaper and provides almost all of the capabilities of 052B (including much stronger ASW). A large PLAN flotilla prior to 052D would surely need both Type 052C and 054A to provide required air defense and anti-submarine defense.

Type 052D provides PLAN with a lot more flexibility. That’s why more Type 052D is expected to be produced than Type 052C. It is equipped with a newer generation of multi-functional radar, new variable depth sonar along with other new sensors. More importantly, it’s the first surface combatant with the universal VLS. Type 052D could also maintain a more balanced profile with 32 cells for long range SAM, 8 cells for quad-packed medium range SAM, 8 cells for anti-ship missiles, 8 cells for LACMs and 8 cells for ASROC like missile. That would provide comparable air defense to 052C while having increased firepower in ASuW and ASW. If 052D is given the task of area air defense, it can utilize all of its VLS for the purpose of air defense. They can use 48 cells for long range SAM and remaining 16 cells for quad-packed medium range SAM or even 56 cells for long range SAM and remaining 8 cells for quad-packed medium range SAM. Both of which would provide solid protection for the ship itself and surrounding fleet once we factor in the 24-cell HQ-10 SAM and 7-barrelled PJ-12 CIWS for point defense. Another possible usage is in BMD, although I'm not sure if the technical characteristics of 052D's radar allows it to do tracking and target discrimination of ballistic missile threats. This role might be left for Type 055 cruisers. In theory, you could put the reported HQ-26 missile (or some other SM-3 like missile) on 052D along with other air defense missiles in the BMD role.

With the addition of PJ-38 artillery gun and VLS launched LACMs, 052D could be PLAN's first ship to have major land attack capabilities. PJ-38 would provide 052D with the ability to support amphibious landings like Sov destroyers. Long range LACMs would finally give PLAN the ability to attack land target from far away. This is a capability that PLAN really never needed when they were a brown or green water navy. Even though YJ-62 launchers were removed, 052D could also be fitted with 16+ anti-ship missiles in an ASuW profile. All of the SAMs should also have secondary anti-ship mode. If they develop PJ-38 into being able to launch over the horizon anti-ship projectiles, 052D could be quite powerful in ASuW missions. Finally, Type 052D can also be PLAN's most effective surface ship in ASW missions. Its universal VLS can hold longer ranged ASROC missiles than Type 054A's VLS. Type 054A is almost limited to the short legged Z-9C helicopter while 052D could also use Ka-28 helicopters (and Z-15/20 in the future). With a more powerful sonar suite than Type 054A, it would be better suited for ASW missions in blue waters.

At the moment, 052D is China's primary surface combatant and expected to provide the most important roles in escorting a fleet. It is likely to be useful in China's navy for a long time because it is using China's first universal VLS and an artillery gun that can launch different type of projectiles. Its close in defense systems could easily be upgraded. New missiles and projectiles could probably be supported on 052D in the future with software updates or relatively small hardware upgrades. PLAN currently has the problem where it often does not replace outdated weapon system because of cost and supply concerns. That's why the recent Type 052 upgrades only changed the CIWS. Type 052D is first ship in PLAN to really benefit from a more plug and play approach that USN has enjoyed for years. Even when Type 055 joins service, Type 052D could still be very useful in land attack or ASuW or ASW roles.

CNAS EVP, Former Obama NSC Official, Shawn Brimley on UCLASS

Here's a piece on the Defense One site by Shawn Brimley, who used to work at the Obama White House and now helps run the Center for a New American Security.  In it, Brimley takes the same position I've been advocating here for months, that the Navy was moving in the wrong direction on UCLASS.  In his words:

"The Navy made a mistake by issuing requirements that guarantee the fleet will receive a lesser drone than it could be getting. The Navy is asking for a carrier-version of non-stealthy surveillance drones that operate in uncontested (friendly) airspace. That costly decision will prevent the development of a true, surveillance-strike drone that can operate where they truly will be needed, in enemy airspace."  

So, it seems that I share the same position as a Democratic national security thought leader who used to be in the Obama White House.  And that opinion is shared with the Republican Chairman of the HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA).  And a good bit of the intellectual energy behind all three of our opinions comes from the thinking of recently installed Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Work, while at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

That's what we call "consensus".

Bryan McGrath