Hello from Arkansas, my home this week and part of the rest of the month. For those who have been wondering what is going on, my father passed away last week and I have returned to the home of my youth to be with family.
I hope that things will soon return to normal, only 1500+ more email to catch up reading. I appreciate everyone who have sent private messages, posts on Facebook, and prayers, Thank you - things are good but I will be home in NY fewer days in November than I will be elsewhere, meaning if you are expecting me to send you something it may not happen until December.
As you may have noticed, I moved from JS-KIT to DISQUS with the comment system. JSKIT support has wasted enough of my time. While I still have all the old comments saved, I have not quite figured out how to move them into the posts they once belonged... yet.
Except for getting the old posts to show up, I consider this the last of messing around with the comment system. Anyone can post as long as they are logged in, while anonymous posts will be moderated. Additionally, this system allows me to give moderation authority to the other authors.
This time, officially and God willing, I hope that things on the blog return to normal. I have only 6 more work days (as of now anyway) the rest of 2009, so I may soon run out of excuses for not posting.
Tuesday, November 10, 2024
Koreans Mix It Up At Sea
It appears that the North and South Koreans mixed it up about 120 miles off Inchon yesterday, in what the article cited as an example of an every few years exchange of the kind.
The sea border remains undefined between these nations.
Bryan McGrath
The sea border remains undefined between these nations.
Bryan McGrath
Saturday, November 7, 2024
Sensible Advice From The Sage of Singapore
The President is gearing up for an important visit to East Asia next week, and by way of preparation, Lee Kuan Yew stopped by to chat about his neighborhood. In the process, Mr. Lee passed along some sage advice to the President, advice that obviously carries with it significant implications for the Navy.
"If you do not hold your ground in the Pacific, you cannot be a world leader."
What does this mean? It means that if we want influence in the region, we cannot cede--nor can we be seen to be ceding--influence. It means that we must continue to look at regional security issues in East Asia as much, much more than a Taiwan scenario or a North Korea scenario. It means a steady hand, even as longtime allies like Japan flirt with "redefining" our relationship. It means a respectful posture toward China and its "rise", but not one that ushers in some sense of inevitability. And at the macro-macro level, it means getting our domestic house in order so that we can continue to be the economic power the world needs us to be--the trusted hand on the tiller.
Bryan McGrath
"If you do not hold your ground in the Pacific, you cannot be a world leader."
What does this mean? It means that if we want influence in the region, we cannot cede--nor can we be seen to be ceding--influence. It means that we must continue to look at regional security issues in East Asia as much, much more than a Taiwan scenario or a North Korea scenario. It means a steady hand, even as longtime allies like Japan flirt with "redefining" our relationship. It means a respectful posture toward China and its "rise", but not one that ushers in some sense of inevitability. And at the macro-macro level, it means getting our domestic house in order so that we can continue to be the economic power the world needs us to be--the trusted hand on the tiller.
Bryan McGrath
Thursday, November 5, 2024
Technical Issues
A few readers have emailed me to let me know that there are some technical issues with the site, seemingly mostly for Firefox users.
I'll pass them along to Galrahn, who is taking care of some personal business right now. Please keep checking back into the site to see new posts and the status of issue resolution.
Bryan McGrath
Update: Here is what's happening. The comments were upgraded from Haloscan to JSKIT over the past 24 hours and I have not adjusted the blog code accordingly yet. Will be taking care of this soon. My time is very limited the next 48 hours, but I will try to get this resolved. I apologize for the inconvenience and disruption this has on the blog.
I'll pass them along to Galrahn, who is taking care of some personal business right now. Please keep checking back into the site to see new posts and the status of issue resolution.
Bryan McGrath
Update: Here is what's happening. The comments were upgraded from Haloscan to JSKIT over the past 24 hours and I have not adjusted the blog code accordingly yet. Will be taking care of this soon. My time is very limited the next 48 hours, but I will try to get this resolved. I apologize for the inconvenience and disruption this has on the blog.
Wednesday, November 4, 2024
The Navy and Ready to Launch Satellites
The Commander of the United States Strategic Command, General Kevin Chilton, USAF, gave a speech this week in which he presented the view that he would give up state-of-the-art space systems in order to swell the number of satellites the military could launch as the need arises. I rise in support of the General's view, and I would suggest that the Navy has a role to play here.
China's January 2007 ASAT test sent the US a message, that The Middle Kingdom intends asymmetrically to challenge our space dominance and our ability to exercise global command and control of our forces. This is an interesting development, one that demands a strategic response.
Clearly, if we were to assess the Chinese as having more than a "one off" capability to deny us the use of space, we (the Nation) must figure out a way to contest this capability. Persistent airborne relay systems are one part of the answer, but effective "Operational Space Responsiveness" (OSR) must also be part of the strategy. To that end, Navy platforms--surface and subsurface--should be considered for launch platforms for rapidly programmable satellites that would gap-fill or repair architectures disrupted by enemy ASAT attack.
One candidate for such a capability is the replacement for the OHIO Class SSBN. Rather than looking at the SSBN's strategic role in a narrowly focused way--i.e. as the platform for delivering nuclear ICBM's--the OHIO Replacement should be seen as a true STRATEGIC asset, one that could continue its strategic nuclear role, while also serving as a launch platform for rapidly programmable satellites, as well as long range conventional weapons and possibly even boost phase interceptors.
Additionally, the CG(X) class should be planned with missile launching systems that would be flexible enough to accommodate the large-size of rapidly programmable satellites--as well as the systems recommended above for the Ohio Replacement.
Critics of such initiatives generally take come in two flavors. The first wonder (with justification) whether these missions are best or properly carried out by Naval platforms, and this is a question worth some credible analysis. I just don't know the answer.
The other variety of critic is the one who looks at the employment of ballistic objects--missiles or satellites--from US naval platforms as inherently destabilizing. This line of thinking was of course, very logical when we were squaring off with the Soviet Union. But it strikes me as an intellectual surrender to think that we would take such capability off the table now for fear of its being misinterpreted (as in, how would someone else know whether the ballistic object launched was an ICBM nuke, an ICBM conventional, or a satellite) while we sit back and allow a Chinese developed anti-ship ballistic missile to partially drive Navy shipbuilding plans without so much as a peep as to the destabilizing nature of the weapon. Yes--I know--the ASBM's are not ICBMS--they are MRBM's. And I know that we have some capacity to discern this--at some point in the flight of the missile. But let's face it--until such time as an evaluation is made that the missile is not an ICBM headed for the US, it COULD be. Hence, the destabilizing nature of the launch.
Which brings me back to quicklaunch of rapidly programmable satellites. Such a capability--architected with airborne gap filler comms/sensor relays--provides the Chinese with a moving target so to speak, one that would be increasingly difficult to overcome. The Chinese are MAKING us compete with them (by the development of the ASBM). Let's get into the game.
Bryan McGrath
China's January 2007 ASAT test sent the US a message, that The Middle Kingdom intends asymmetrically to challenge our space dominance and our ability to exercise global command and control of our forces. This is an interesting development, one that demands a strategic response.
Clearly, if we were to assess the Chinese as having more than a "one off" capability to deny us the use of space, we (the Nation) must figure out a way to contest this capability. Persistent airborne relay systems are one part of the answer, but effective "Operational Space Responsiveness" (OSR) must also be part of the strategy. To that end, Navy platforms--surface and subsurface--should be considered for launch platforms for rapidly programmable satellites that would gap-fill or repair architectures disrupted by enemy ASAT attack.
One candidate for such a capability is the replacement for the OHIO Class SSBN. Rather than looking at the SSBN's strategic role in a narrowly focused way--i.e. as the platform for delivering nuclear ICBM's--the OHIO Replacement should be seen as a true STRATEGIC asset, one that could continue its strategic nuclear role, while also serving as a launch platform for rapidly programmable satellites, as well as long range conventional weapons and possibly even boost phase interceptors.
Additionally, the CG(X) class should be planned with missile launching systems that would be flexible enough to accommodate the large-size of rapidly programmable satellites--as well as the systems recommended above for the Ohio Replacement.
Critics of such initiatives generally take come in two flavors. The first wonder (with justification) whether these missions are best or properly carried out by Naval platforms, and this is a question worth some credible analysis. I just don't know the answer.
The other variety of critic is the one who looks at the employment of ballistic objects--missiles or satellites--from US naval platforms as inherently destabilizing. This line of thinking was of course, very logical when we were squaring off with the Soviet Union. But it strikes me as an intellectual surrender to think that we would take such capability off the table now for fear of its being misinterpreted (as in, how would someone else know whether the ballistic object launched was an ICBM nuke, an ICBM conventional, or a satellite) while we sit back and allow a Chinese developed anti-ship ballistic missile to partially drive Navy shipbuilding plans without so much as a peep as to the destabilizing nature of the weapon. Yes--I know--the ASBM's are not ICBMS--they are MRBM's. And I know that we have some capacity to discern this--at some point in the flight of the missile. But let's face it--until such time as an evaluation is made that the missile is not an ICBM headed for the US, it COULD be. Hence, the destabilizing nature of the launch.
Which brings me back to quicklaunch of rapidly programmable satellites. Such a capability--architected with airborne gap filler comms/sensor relays--provides the Chinese with a moving target so to speak, one that would be increasingly difficult to overcome. The Chinese are MAKING us compete with them (by the development of the ASBM). Let's get into the game.
Bryan McGrath
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