Friday, August 24, 2024

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

The Enterprise Carrier Strike Group

USS Enterprise (CVN 65)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64)
USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98)
USS James E. Williams (DDG 95)
USS Philadelphia (SSN 690)


Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)
USS Denver (LPD 9)
USS Rushmore (LSD 47)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93)
USS Chosin (CG 65)


Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Kearsarge (LHD 3)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Porter (DDG 78)
USS Carr (FFG 52)
USS Miami (SSN 755)


Task Force 150

FGS Köln (F211)
FS Commandant Blaison (F793)
FS Dupleix (D 641)
PNS Tippu Sultan (D 185)
USS Carter Hill (LSD 50)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HMS Richmond (F 239)
JDS Suzunami (DD114)
HMAS Anzac (F 150)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

Thursday, August 23, 2024

Evidence of the Devolution of Al Qaeda

It would be impossible for the US government to ever come out and say it, and it wouldn't be very popular for anyone in the media, or another government to point out the specifics, but there is a mounting amount of evidence that Al Qaeda is in devolution.

The most obvious place Al Qaeda is on the run is Iraq. As Michael Yon pointed out earlier this year, the evidence is everywhere that the Sunni tribes have rejected Al Qaeda, in some places in mass. While progress against Al Qaeda in Anbar, and to some degree Diyala, is a sign of Al Qaeda on the run in Iraq, Al Qaeda is a global operation and Iraq is only part of the Al Qaeda problem.

Africa also has an Al Qaeda problem, but the results there are mixed, and the trends are working against Al Qaeda. Morocco has been cracking down hard on Al Qaeda members, and Al Qaeda members have been more apt at blowing themselves up lately than their intended targets. Due to its high profile bombings, Al Qaeda has lost any actual support it may have had in Morocco. Without that base of support, operations have become difficult at best.

Al Qaeda is also losing the hearts and minds in Algeria. The latest news out of Algeria is just plain odd, organizations rarely announce they have had a complete breakdown in command, but that is what Al Qaeda did in Algeria. This could be a major government PSYOP, or it might be a sign of problems with the Al Qaeda leadership in Algeria, but either way the people are turning on Al Qaeda. Algerian media is anything but open, and it has been a hammer on Al Qaeda operations lately in Algeria. Without local support, again Al Qaeda is running for the hills in yet another African country.

Then I read this interesting post about Al Qaeda in Pakistan at Castle Argghhh! It is a personal testimony report on a wave of various operations taking place in Pakistan, and illustrates how the tribes have leverage over Al Qaeda, not the other way around as is often depicted in the media. I dismissed it until I read the same thing today in stratfor from the article Al Qaeda: The Split Between the Apex and the Franchises, posted August 23, 2024

in the bigger picture, AQCAM appears to be falling victim to a common problem confronting the al Qaeda network as a whole: how to maintain viable support networks within its countries of operations. One of the essentials of an effective terrorist organization is the ability to build and maintain a constituency that can provide support, either passive or active, to allow the organization to function without excessively obsessing over operational security concerns. Stratfor noted that the car bombing targeting former Islamist rebel leader Kertali would only exacerbate intra-Islamist tensions in Algeria, with more moderate Islamists building up a stronger incentive to sell out the jihadists in order to secure their own livelihood. If the jihadists have expanded their targeting selection to include their former Islamist comrades, they can very quickly see their safe havens dry up, similar to what the jihadists in Iraq's Anbar -- and to a lesser extent, Diyala -- province are experiencing since the Sunni tribal groups have turned against the jihadists. Local resistance against jihadists in Pakistan also has grown substantially since the Red Mosque episode, placing al Qaeda's apex leadership in an increasingly vulnerable position.

AQCAM = al Qaeda Organization for the Countries of the Arab Maghreb
All of this follows the insistence by Fatah Al-Islam (FAI) (the group that has been fighting Lebanon on the Syrian border) that they are not, emphatically not, associated with Al Qaeda. They don't want that association, because Al Qaeda is no longer vogue. Al Qaeda has a credibility problem, and is being discredited. For states this issue is solved by developing alliances, see the relationship of North Korea and Iran with China as a good example. Islamist resistance alliances may be the only option Al Qaeda has, which could lead them to form relationships with Hezbollah and other strong Islamist resistance groups to better situate the organization to fight Americans. As Egyption editorialist Dyab Abu Jahjah points out, such a tactic wouldn't be the first time "Al-Qaeda would serve American interests while believing it is fighting them."

Now if we can take on Eritrea and Somalia, maybe we can push Al Qaeda out of the Horn of Africa. Regardless, the US and allies are clearly winning the war, and right now looks like a bad time to reduce the pressure.

Meet Japan's New Destroyer - Updated

Japan launched their latest warship today in Yokohama, the 13,500 ton (18,000 tons at full load) "Helicopter Destroyer" JDS Hyuga (DDH 181). The first noticeable feature is this is the largest warship operated by Japan since World War II. The second noticeable feature is this isn't actually a destroyer anywhere except Japan.

Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states "the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." In that spirit JDS Hyuga (DDH 181) will deploy three SH-60J and one MCH-101, although it is reported to have the capacity for 11 helicopters, and can fully support the large CH-53E if necessary.

Payload includes a 16 cell MK41 with 64 ESSMs enabled by the a Thales missile control module and the Mitsubishi FCS-3 radar. With an expected crew around 350, the JDS Hyuga (DDH 181) is designed to be a flagship for the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces, providing command and control capabilities to the fleet while using its organic helicopters to support ASW and MIW operations, or operations other than war.

While not an official aircraft carrier, JDS Hyuga (DDH 181) is about as close as it gets without a constitutional amendment.

Update 1: More photo's posted online here.

Naval Programs: June 2007 Selected Acquisition Report

SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary








(Dollars As Of Date: June 30, 2024 in Millions)
Weapon System Base Year Current Cost Estimates

NAVY :
Base Year $ Then Year $ Quantity


ADS 05 575.6 528.8

AGM-88E (AARGM) 03 1,415.50 1,691.30 1,919

AIM-9X 97 2,644.90 3,388.00 10,142

CEC 02 4,149.90 4,448.70 271

CH-53K (HLR) 06 15,075.30
156

COBRA JUDY 03 1,360.60 1,520.50 1

CVN 21 00 25,260.60 35,028.70 3

CVN 68 95 5,286.70 6,240.20 1

DDG 1000 (DD(X)) 05 30,566.40 36,022.10 10

DDG 51 87 46,495.90 62,752.90 62

E-2D AHE 02 13,366.20 17,487.00 75

EA-18G 04 7,306.20 8,368.00 80

EFV 07 13,188.40 15,972.10 593


ERM 05 1,242.70 1,478.00 15,100

F/A-18E/F 00 43,396.60 46,388.80 494

H-l UPGRADES 96 6,694.50 8,706.50 284

JSOW 90 3,253.10 4,611.90 10,334

LCS (RDT&E) 04 1,791.80 1,938.90 2

LHA REPLACEMENT
163.7 3,280.90 1

LPD 17 96 11,103.40 13,594.00 9

MH-60R 06 10,852.60 11,701.70 254

MH-60S 98 6,538.00 7,909.60 267

MUOS 04 5,385.90 6,372.90 6

NMT 02 1,718.00 2,133.80 333

P-8A (MMA) 04 25,864.60 32,672.60 114

RMS 06 1,298.20 1,411.70 108

SM-6 04 4,660.50 5,957.70 1,200

SSDS MK 2 P3I 04 559.3 674.4 42

SSGN (OHIO CLASS) 02 3,857.30 4,095.20 4

SSN 774 (VA CLASS 95 64,586.70 93,008.20 30

T-45TS 95 6,732.90 6,825.60 225

T-AKE 00 3,856.50 4,628.80 11

TACTICAL TOMAHAWK 99 3,819.00 4,539.40 3,536

TRIDENT I I MSL 83 26,425.40 38,901.90 561

V-22 05 50,610.50 54,636.80 458

VH-71 03 5,252.70 6,144.80 28

VTUAV 06 1,860.00 2,100.60 177









Source: DefenseLink

Statistics can make one a liar, but it is interesting nonetheless.

Combined the Navy and Marine Corps are currently acquiring an estimated $576,053,400 in major programs. Follow the link for information on the other services.

Looking For Lights In the Fog

As October approaches, I'm getting a bit anxious to read the new Maritime Strategy being prepared by the US Navy. Clearly the Navy is already in a state of change, or is the word flux, as transition in the Navy is evident by the abundance of guidance, visions, operational concepts, appraisals, evaluations, programs, initiatives, recommendations, and decisions flowing from an unparalleled number of statements of naval strategy.

How does one take a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, a National Military Strategy, a National Strategy for Maritime Security, a National Fleet Policy, and a Quadrennial Defense Review and somehow balance Naval Power 21, Sea Power 21, and a Naval Operational Concept to put together a document of strategy relevant to our time and for the future of the Navy.

This daunting task is made more difficult by the environment in which the strategy will be introduced. Politics today are as polarizing as they are partisan, with clear divisions in the very role of the US as a nation and as a military power in foreign policy, made more difficult with the nation currently engaged in two ground wars; engaged in a long war with an elusive, idealogical enemy operating outside our western Westphalian System; while at the same time witnessing the early phases of the rise of an economic and potential future maritime military peer.

The United States has achieved absolute tactical superiority through information superiority and exploiting our technological advantage since the end of World War II, and yet the US hasn't won a major strategic victory in any military conflict since. General James Conway recently made the statement that "the Marine Corps wins battles but the Army wins the Nation’s wars," I would add to that statement by saying the Navy wins the Nation's peace, with the cold war as evidence.

I believe that this will be especially true in the future; that for the United States to win the peace in the 21st century, the Navy will require a systematic approach to the escalation and de-escalation of conflicts both small and large through security, deterrence, and defending the homeland.

Even brilliance in military strategy can't overcome however the major hurdle facing the Navies new maritime strategy, specifically the absence of political policy based on an effective national strategy. As I have already highlighted, the nation is in abundance of "National" strategies, and feel free to read them carefully for evidence they are effective. The term political strategy in the US today has very little to do with national interest, rather the term revolves around partisan idealogical political objectives. Our nation eats its own in the absence of a clear and defined external threat, which is ironic considering we fight two ground wars and see major challenges that directly effect our national interests over the horizon in every direction.

We live in a dangerous time of second string Monday Morning Quarterbacks populating the big chairs in the media and political class. Their hubris is so grand they assume the role to advise Generals on tactical moves like surge or withdrawal, and pass on this advice in tactics by calling it a strategy, in absolute abuse of the term. Ironic how the political class does this, considering they themselves have no strategies at all, and to this day are in complete reliance of the military strategy alone to achieve strategic victory in war. While most are discouraged by this, I am not convinced this is a bad thing, considering it is the application of unclear political strategies in every war since WWII that has lost us those wars. The way I see it, at least in Iraq the military has a clear objective and can choose to let Baghdad instead of DC handle the political decisions, which is probably for the better, since the military today is probably better received in Baghdad than it is in DC.

Petraeus continues to advance a successful military strategy. This strategy is clearly in the national interest of the United States, no matter what ones personal feelings are on Iraq, yet in the political class in America there is evidence and statements as much that this somehow isn't a good thing. Given that successful military strategies in winning the nations wars aren't accepted in today's political environment as a good thing, how should one expect the Navy maritime strategy for peace to be received?